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ABSTRACT 
 The Maritime Area Denial Mine with Autonomous Navigation (MADMAN) 
project provides a means for asserting maritime dominance through integration of 
intelligence into mines. This project identifies a path toward reinvigorating mine warfare 
innovation to develop the mine of the future, MADMAN. Modeling and simulation tools 
reveal that the highest mission success probabilities support an unmanned underwater 
vehicle (UUV) option. By integrating current, available systems, a resulting system of 
systems provides a cost-effective means to develop a mine that is capable of 
autonomously transiting to a location, arming itself, performing missions, and increasing 
personnel safety. Using a capability engineering approach, this study identifies an overall 
target probability of success for the system of systems. This overall success probability 
decomposes the individual systems and highlights their level of impact on overall 
success. Analyzing these impacts allows tailoring of each system to provide improved 
mining and cost savings while meeting project requirements. Resulting collaboration 
between UUV designers and military engineers ensures a modern arsenal for a modern 
world. 
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The United States Navy does not currently possess the capability to deploy mines 
from either surface ships or submarines (Truver 2015). In the past, mine warfare 
acquisition focused on mine countermeasures. The Navy’s current use of unmanned 
undersea vehicles (UUVs) is limited to countermeasures and mine detection. UUVs 
operate in shallow waters, but their limited size likely prevents them from playing a key 
role in mine deployment. Current acquisition programs for fielding a mine deployable 
from manned vessels during armed conflict do not exist. Combatant Commanders 
expressed a renewed interest in a versatile and broadly applicable naval mining 
capability. A cornerstone of this effort must be the development of an autonomous UUV 
capability that provides the clandestine deployment of naval mines in response to 
Combatant Commanders’ needs.  
The purpose of this project is to develop viable system alternatives for achieving 
naval mine offensive capabilities. This project addresses the current gaps in the U.S. 
Navy’s undersea offensive mining capability, and proposes an autonomous delivery 
system architecture to enable improved offensive mining while reducing risks associated 
with manual deployment.  A capability-based engineering analysis process focused on the 
current Navy and commercial capabilities to identify gaps that prevent such an 
autonomous delivery capability today. Thorough investigation of existing systems and 
the inability of those systems to meet mission needs resulted in a set of potential system 
candidates and recommended technology improvements. Evaluations focused on the 
capabilities required to establish autonomous systems architectures for mining operations 
in conflicted littoral areas.  
Successful conduct of effective autonomous mine warfare hinges on the 
accomplishment of six key objectives. The system must not only provide access to target 
areas, avoid detection, and fit within current naval vessels but also arm/disarm mines 
following operator commands. This system must also dispose mines when commanded 
by disabling explosives in place after verification of an environment free of commercial 
and civilian traffic and achieve all of these goals with a significant reduction or 
 iii 
elimination of risk to human life. This risk reduction comes from adding in autonomous 
features to the system, preventing the need for human interaction in multiple parts of the 
mission activity. Ultimately, the system must meet all of these goals with acceptable 
suitability traits, such as system reliability, operational availability, and probability of 
mission success. With these key objectives in mind, a system context diagram helped 
scope the effort while extensive research revealed existing capabilities and gaps to 
provide a starting point for expanding those technologies to achieve the mission.  
Maritime Area Denial Mine with Autonomous Navigation (MADMAN) is a mine 
that exerts explosive force on adversary vehicles that enter in range of any sensors. These 
sensors respond to proximity, acoustic signature, or magnetic field from the adversary 
vehicle. With the definition of MADMAN understood, the investigation shifted to its 
deployment. Three alternatives appeared during the study for the deployment of 
MADMAN, 1) UUV, 2) Wave Glider, and 3) Aircraft. OV-1s depicted these three 
alternatives of how the MADMAN reaches the target location and decomposed system 
capabilities. The concept of operations detailed the separate phases of the operational 
activities within the system and potential scenarios. The four operational phases, pre-
deployment phase, deployment phase, engagement phase, and post-engagement phase, 
demonstrated where portions of the mission begin and end while displaying which 
segments contain autonomous features or requirements.  
The hierarchy of capabilities describing what MADMAN must do to achieve 
mission success provided a better system understanding and identified the operational 
activities supported; navigation, deactivation, monitoring, detonation, propulsion, and 
communication. The MADMAN capability hierarchy highlighted areas for potential 
leveraging of current technology. The MADMAN project focuses on the integration of 
already existing systems into a functional system of systems weapons, navigational, 
monitoring, propulsion, anchoring, communication, and autonomous systems all 
currently exist. The results contained in this study provided an assessment of three viable 




• transporting the mine, autonomy, system integration, and incorporation of 
mine sensors  
• operational range, communication capability, position accuracy, and 
stealth 
While all three alternatives addressed the requirements, each alternative addressed 
requirements at varying levels. Examining technical capability, performance, cost, and 
risk provided clarity and set the stage for comparing the alternatives. Simulations using 
Microsoft Excel in conjunction with the Real Options Valuation Risk Simulator add-in, 
Microsoft Visio, and SPEC Innovations Innoslate systems engineering toolkit provided 
success metrics for each portion of the deployment chain for each alternative, resulting in 
a final success likelihood of mine deployment. Initial simulation results of simulations 
demonstrated that the UUV option outperformed the Wave Glider and aircraft options. 
From a basic modeling perspective, this meant that the UUV successfully placed more 
mines, more frequently, with fewer failures than that of the other options. Once identified 
as the better option, a sensitivity analysis revealed potential probability leniency for the 
individual systems in the deployment chain. This leniency translates to cost savings, 
allowing for less restrictive system requirements on certain systems. By lowering the 
stringent probability requirements, systems do not need to attain unreasonable 
probabilities to reach a final goal. The redesign additionally resulted in the UUV 
performing better in simulations when faced with high-density obstacle environments.  
From the resulting research performed and simulation results, the team 
recommended developing the MADMAN using the UUV deployment option. The team 
also recommended enlisting support from the designers or engineers from the company of 
the selected UUV model because integration of existing systems with the offensive 
mining aspect still needs development. Early involvement of designers and engineers 
ensures first-hand support and experience with any integration issues encountered 
throughout the lifecycle of the system. The most alluring aspect of this project is the 
ability to use existing autonomous systems. Where possible, improvements in launch 
success probability and automated obstacle avoidance capability increases MADMAN 
mission success probability. Once integrated, these improvements provide autonomy for 
 v 
the overall system and create a safer system by removing the human element in the 
deployment, delivery, and placement of the mine.  
In today’s environment, funding is a constant concern and the MADMAN is an 
ideal candidate to minimize cost while maximizing operational effectiveness. Reuse 
affords minimal need for new design or system development. Many UUV architectures 
provide “plug and play” system capabilities. Many such UUV systems are already in use 
performing mine countermeasure activities; repurposing these UUVs as offensive, mine 
delivery systems requires relatively little effort.  
The UUV option demonstrated a consistently high probability of mission success 
when deploying mines and, from a purely simulation perspective, was the clear leader. 
From a technical perspective, the UUV contains the systems capabilities necessary for 
mission success and requires minimal effort to rework into an offensive mining 
capability. The performance of the UUV from a transit and mission perspective requires 
minimal testing because the systems operate successfully in missions similar those of 
MADMAN. This known functionality, minimal need for testing, evaluation, and 
integration lowers cost significantly. Finally, from a risk perspective, these UUVs 
perform for long periods allowing them to travel far beyond dangerous proximity to 
personnel. Keeping our personnel free from harm is paramount in warfare and this 
alternative increases that safety by allowing personnel to initiate mine deployment from a 
significant distance. 
Pioneering into undeveloped technologies presents risk. Throughout all military 
history, project development does not have a perfect success rate. This risk forces 
leadership and stakeholders to be more discerning in their procurement and project 
decisions. This project is low risk in development and cost. The components necessary to 
construct MADMAN exist and evaluation in this study provides the Navy alternatives for 
the maritime warfare.  
vi 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The United States Navy currently depends upon aircraft to deploy mines because 
it lacks mine delivery systems on surface ships and submarines. This dependency places 
U.S. Navy personnel at risk of attack when deploying mines, especially in the shallow 
water regions surrounding many key points of military interest. Naval mines have the 
ability to shape naval battle space through strategic channeling, denying passage, and 
disabling enemy vessels during conflict. Naval mines can also slow or completely stop 
movement through restricted waters or approaches to restricted land sites.  
Current mine warfare (MIW) research mostly focuses on mine countermeasures 
(MCM). The U.S. Navy is increasing its capabilities in MCM, but the combatant 
commanders continue to lack the operational capability to covertly deliver and place 
naval mines. Examination of this capability need provides a concept for an intelligent 
offensive mining system. The Maritime Area Denial Mine with Autonomous Navigation, 
or MADMAN, is a proposed system that provides an offensive mining capability, 
utilizing autonomous features to complete mission objectives.  
A. BACKGROUND 
United States Naval MIW began with the development of the drifting mine by Mr. 
David Bushnell. While studying at Yale, Mr. Bushnell invented the Bushnell Keg as 
shown in Figure 1 (Naval Mine Warfare Engineering Activity 1985). The National 
Research Council (2000) stated, the Bushnell Keg “consisted of a wooden keg filled with 
gunpowder and fitted with a primitive contact fuse.” While the Bushnell Keg was not 




Figure 1. The Bushnell Keg. Source: Naval Mine Warfare Engineering Activity 
(1985). 
The Bushnell Keg mine was a form of contact mine.  These mines did not need 
human intervention to explode and ignition occurred through any form of contact, usually 
with a ship. On 12 December 1862, USS Cairo (Figure 2) was the first U.S. Navy ship 
sunk by a naval mine. 
 
Figure 2. USS Cairo. Source: Learning Lincoln Online (2017). 
3 
The USS Cairo event intensified the psychological impact of underwater 
minefields. Naval forces became acutely aware of the dangers that mines presented to 
their ships and personnel. In times of conflict, this perceived and very real danger 
translated to a battlefield advantage for those laying the minefields. Retaining this 
advantage naturally led to improvements in mines. Design iteration over many years 
resulted in nine general types of mines, six depicted in Figure 3 and the explanation for 
the remaining three later in this chapter.  
B. NAVAL MINE TYPES 
As seen in Figure 3, modern mining utilizes a broad spectrum of features. 
Figure 3. Naval Mine Types. Source: Picard (2017). 
• Moored Mines. These mines anchor to the seabed. With early versions
relying on contact, modern versions can use acoustic, magnetic, and
pressure sensors to detect when an enemy is nearby.
4 
• Short Wire Moored Mines. Short wire moored mines are almost identical
in capability and structure to moored mines as see in Figure 4 (Farrington
2017). They have a shorter wire to keep them well below the surface,
creating a more dangerous hazard to both ships and submarines.
Figure 4. Short Wire Moored Mine. Source: Farrington (2017). 
• Drifting Mines. As the name implies, a drifting mine is a mine without a
tether and moves through the water using the sea current and wind as seen
in Figure 5. The use of untethered mines is incredibly dangerous and
against maritime law. Once a drifting mine deploys, it is very difficult to
monitor its position. These types of mines are obsolete. These mines, used
mostly during World War 1 and II, are no longer relevant. However,
modern tethered mines become drifting mines if their tether breaks.
5 
Figure 5. Drifting Mine. Source: Warfaresims.com (2016). 
• Subsurface Drifting Mines. These mines are similar to drifting mines, but
their negative buoyancy prevents them from reaching the surface. In dark
waters, they are difficult to see, making them even more dangerous than
drifting mines that lay on the surface of the water.
• Mobile Mines. A mobile mine uses a two-phase approach. In its first
phase, the mobile mine uses some form of propellant to reach a location.
In the second phase, the mine settles to the bottom and becomes a bottom
mine.
• Bottom Mines. Bottom mines placed on the seabed lie covered in
sediment, either intentionally or over time. These mines most closely
resemble landmines and are more difficult to detect. These mines are most
dangerous to submarines and ships transiting shallow waters.
• Rising Mines. Rising mines, similar to torpedo mines, uses buoyancy
instead of propulsion to rise to a passing enemy ship or submarine.
• Torpedo Mines. Torpedo mines, as seen in Figure 6 (Proshkin 1999) are
more intelligent than a standard moored mine and can directly seek out
enemies. The mine is tethered, and using onboard sensors for enemy
detection, propels the explosive warhead to the target.
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Figure 6. Torpedo Mines. Source: Proshkin (1999). 
A notable mine not mentioned above is the dummy mine. Although a dummy 
mine does not contain explosive materials, the general mine construction remains the 
same. Use of dummy mines results in the expenditure of enemy resources to inspect and 
or remove them before allowing friendly shipping or combatants’ passage due to the fear 
that they might be active mines. Dummy mines do not explode, but they serve as a 
psychological deterrent in warfare, particularly when intermingled with live mines. 
Mixing dummy mines with active mines limit the overall cost of laying a minefield over 
a sizable area. The mines listed above all require personnel involvement for deployment. 
Personnel involvement potentially puts human lives in direct danger during deployment. 
Unmanned vehicles and systems can provide a means to remove the risk. 
Removing the element of risk to humans for a mining system requires the use of 
autonomy. Autonomy, for the purpose of this endeavor, is the ability of the system to 
complete the mission without assistance from external entities. Specifically, the system 
completes the tactical deployment mission without the need for human-in-the-loop 
control after deployment from a host aircraft, ship, or submersible. Studies and examples 
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of autonomous unmanned submarines exist, yet little effort focuses on mine delivery 
from an unmanned undersea vehicle (UUV).  
The Navy’s current use of UUVs in mine warfare is limited to countermeasures 
and lies in a small vehicle, the Swordfish UUV, which supports only mine detection. In 
the past, mine warfare acquisition focused on MCM as seen in the acquisition and 
development of the Bluefin-21 autonomous underwater vehicle and littoral combatant 
ships (LCS) MCM package. Development of the Kingfish and Knifefish UUVs addresses 
only countermeasures and focuses on vehicles that detect mines. Although these vehicles 
can operate in shallow waters, their limited size likely prevents them from playing a key 
role in mine deployment. Larger UUV development projects, including the large 
displacement UUV and extra-large UUV, present more potential for mine deployment 
missions but are still in early development stages.  
The U.S. Navy does not currently possess the capability to deploy mines from 
either surface ships or submarines (Truver 2015). Current acquisition programs to 
develop and field a mine deployable from unmanned vessels during armed conflict do not 
exist at this time. Nonetheless, Combatant Commanders have expressed a renewed 
interest in a versatile and broadly applicable naval mining capability. A cornerstone of 
this effort must be the development of an autonomous UUV capability that can provide 
the clandestine deployment of naval mines in response to Combatant Commanders’ 
needs.  
C. PROJECT PURPOSE 
The purpose of this project is to define a system that increases naval mine 
offensive capabilities. This project addresses current capability gaps in the U.S. Navy’s 
undersea offensive mining mission area and exploits autonomy capabilities to narrow the 
gap between unmanned and manned underwater warfare systems to minimize human risk 
through autonomy. This project examines the capabilities of such an autonomous systems 
architecture to perform mining operations in conflicted littoral areas. This study not only 
defines enhanced UUVs abilities to deliver and place naval mines in response to 
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combatants but also enables the integration of unmanned mining systems with other 
current and future unmanned systems.  
With a focus on offensive mining, this project attempts to expand a collection of 
capabilities from currently existing systems into a complete system, comprised of a 
combination of features. The resulting system will provide a mine that can locate a 
geographical area and engage an enemy target without risking human involvement in 
dangerous waters. 
D. PROBLEM STATEMENT    
Most U.S. naval maritime mine delivery and placement efforts carry out overt 
operations with inherent and inordinate risk to delivery personnel and counter detection 
by enemy forces. UUVs may provide means of mine delivery and placement to reduce 
both of these risks, but no fully autonomous UUV mining capability currently exists. The 
emergence of this system requires a structured and technical capability assessment to 
develop a fully autonomous architecture. 
E. SCOPE  
Combatant Commander’s growing interest in mining provides the foundational 
boundaries for this project. Stakeholder involvement with Naval Postgraduate School 
advisors and substantial team involvement support further refinement of boundaries. The 
project scope includes evolving all aspects of MIW down to focusing on autonomous 
mine laying capability improvement. 
As Kossikoff (2011) notes, “Constructing a diagram such as the system context 
diagram can be invaluable in communicating the boundary of the system. The picture 
clearly and easily identifies the external interfaces needed” (Kossiakoff et al. 2011). This 
high-level view provides an overview of potential factors that are most likely to affect 
MADMAN, or that MADMAN is most likely to affect. As seen in Figure 7, the context 
diagram developed for MADMAN illustrates external factors that reside outside the 
scope of system development.  
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Figure 7. Layered Context Diagram. 
While discussion of the specifics of the MADMAN subsystems exists in Chapter 
IV, the purpose of this diagram is to highlight external elements. The first noted element 
includes friendly and coalition land and sea vehicles that provide transport to a general 
area in preparation for deployment. These vehicles can exchange bidirectional data with 
MADMAN. When stealth is a requirement, the vehicles will likely only transmit data. 
The MADMAN will also interact with the marine environment and must avoid obstacles 
when transiting to a final anchor point. The terrestrial environment should only interact 
with the MADMAN before entering the water. The MADMAN is a mine, and, as 
expected, exerts an explosive force on adversary vehicles that enter in range of any 
sensors. These sensors respond to proximity, acoustic signature, or magnetic field from 
the adversary vehicle. Finally, though indirect, the land and air adversary vehicles affect 
the MADMAN by providing data to the maritime adversary vehicles to identify and 
neutralize the threat.   
When refining the scope of the project, key questions posed include: 
• What are the critical capabilities for a successful system?
• Are these capabilities an improvement on those existing?
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• Are there specific geographical boundaries for the system? 
• What are viable methods for MADMAN deployment? 
• What level of human involvement is required and acceptable? 
• What capabilities will adversaries use now or in the future to counter the 
system? 
Research and simulation can help answer these questions and identify potential 
alternatives for deployment and mining. Naval Postgraduate School capstone advisors, 
who act as subject matter experts, also helped shape the direction and scope of the project 
based on this research. Examination of assumptions, limitations, and constraints of the 
surrounding environment and systems serve to define the system boundaries further.   
1. Assumptions  
The items below are important assumptions the project team incorporated during 
the research phase. These assumptions assist in further defining system requirements and 
ensure the system remains within a clearly defined scope.  
• Current U.S. Navy vehicles can support system delivery. The chosen 
delivery must be able to place the system within range of its target 
location. Choice of the delivery method considers covertly delivering the 
mine while minimizing the ability for interdiction during the delivery 
phase by outside forces.  
• Existing technologies are sufficient to meet location determination needs. 
MADMAN development can leverage one of the many available location 
determination technologies such as Global Positioning System (GPS) 
electronic dead reckoning, inertial navigation systems, or augmented 
terrain-based navigation 
• The MADMAN will autonomously navigate to its mission location by 
using uploaded navigational data points before deployment. In turn, the 
MADMAN will have a positive means of reporting its location after 
deployment, increasing battlespace awareness of naval forces. 
• Current communications technologies can support the remote activation, 
deactivation, and potential recall of the MADMAN system. Deactivation 
of MADMAN allows U.S. forces to control the scale of warfare. This 
capability could enable U.S. forces to transit the mine laid areas; such 
transit would be a significant change from current practice.  
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• Present technologies can meet MADMAN’s internal power and propulsion
needs. Exploiting existing power and propulsion technologies is important.
Leveraging demonstrated technologies (i.e., Swashplate piston engine or
chemical storage system) provides a starting point that with enhancements
may meet system requirements.
2. Limitations and Constraints
The project team separates limitations and constraints into different concepts for 
this project. While similar, limitations report something that the system cannot do within 
the boundary of natural or manufactured laws. Constraints bound the system to increase 
capability only to the point of mission success. For this project and eventual mission 
success, it is prudent to abide by and operate within the noted limitations and constraints. 
A non-exhaustive list of limitations includes:  
• MADMAN uses autonomous mobility only in the relative mission area.
• MADMAN cannot weigh more than the deployment system can handle.
• MADMAN does not contain nuclear devices.
• System design of MADMAN depends on available 2018 technology.
The following constraints demonstrate that the system remains bounded within 
the scope set through requirements interesting to stakeholders. 
• MADMAN detects the location and detonates mines autonomously.
• Development meets budget limits using current equipment on naval
vessels to release mines for mission activity.
• The project remains at the unclassified level.
F. RESEARCH 
The project team conducted extensive literature research and reviews of current 
efforts addressing mining technology. Results of the literature research combined with a 
review centered on the use of MIW technology in adversarial port areas with a focus on 
autonomous deployment of mines. In littoral warfare, mobility is a necessary advantage 
for vessels that require clear paths through sea-lanes. Offensive mining diminishes or 
denies these advantages to enemy forces by reducing freedom of movement and 
preventing enemy vessels from controlling the battlefield. When attempting to avoid a 
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minefield, enemies experience a delay in offensive maneuvers, providing friendly naval 
forces with more time to shape the battlefield and move into advantageous locations 
(National Research Council 2000). At this time, the greatest challenge for the U.S. Navy 
is the deployment of anti-access/area denial (A2AD) (Naval Research Advisory 
Committee 2012). This challenge validates the offensive system even further due to the 
area denial side effects that mining naturally exhibits.  
Each year, a vast amount of documentation refines the use of mines. There was no 
beneficial information found regarding the use of autonomous UUV in the deployment of 
mines. In a previous NPS capstone project report, “Ship Underwater Threat Responses 
System (SUTRS): A feasibility Study of Organic Mine Point Defense,” the Dahlgren 
Team (2012) established UUVs as operating in a “full maritime environment inclusive of 
the littoral regions in the face of the anti-ship mine threat.” While focusing on filling the 
gaps in MCM in the U.S. Naval forces, the information from SUTRS provides the team 
an established baseline for incorporating an offensive autonomous mine deployment into 
these already existing vehicles and capabilities.  
G. SYSTEMS ENGINEERING APPROACH   
 The study implements a capability-based engineering analysis process focusing 
on the development and evolution of capabilities, as depicted in Figure 8.  The capability-
based engineering analysis process is a tailored version of the U.S. Air Force Office of 
Aerospace Studies (2014) process defined in its Capabilities-Based Assessment (CBA) 
Handbook. 
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Figure 8. Expanding Mine Warfare Systems Engineering Process. 
The systems engineering process consists of five phases: research, problem 
definition, capability decomposition, architecture definition, and architecture assessment. 
Although these five phases occur serially, previously defined assumptions found to be 
invalid or overly constraining may be re-examined and improved through phase iteration.  
Phase 1: Research 
The initial research phase identifies the U.S. Navy’s current mining capabilities 
and generates a catalog of relevant weapon systems that were either in development or 
already operational. Capability gaps focused on offense, noted through this research, 
provide an initial set of primitive needs used in subsequent problem definition. The 
weapons system catalog provides a basis for later comparison to the required system 
capabilities identified by this study. 
Phase 2: Problem Definition 
The problem definition phase begins with identification and analysis of 
stakeholders to determine the effective needs. This analysis supports the subsequent 
definition of a general set of required operational capabilities and a value system used in 
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quantifying the degree to which the operational capabilities are satisfied by a candidate 
design. Operational and functional analysis of the detailed capability requirements 
defines detailed operational scenarios, physical decompositions, and an objective 
hierarchy for the design solution.  
Phase 3: Capability Decomposition 
During the capability decomposition phase, the general operational capabilities 
decompose into detailed capability requirements. Similarly, additional operational and 
functional analyses define the detailed functional architecture and operational scenarios. 
The products from this phase provide sufficient detail to support the definition and 
assessment of specific architectural solutions. 
Phase 4: Architecture Definition  
Development of comprehensive system architecture and clear definition of 
technology needs validate Navy’s requirements and needs in the naval MIW arena. 
During the architecture definition phase, the physical allocation of functions and 
capabilities to specific system components create architecture options. This allocation 
identifies all of the required system components such as UUVs and mines, and the 
quantities of each component.  
Phase 5: Architecture Assessment 
Exercising system architecture in the simulation during the architecture 
assessment phase predicts system performance. The value system created in the problem 
definition phase allows scoring of the various architecture options based on performance 
simulation results. Analysis of performance results identifies opportunities for 
improvement in both the overall architecture and the requirements allocated to each 
system component. Each architectural design iteration and simulation result confirms the 
effectiveness of these improvements. Next, a comparison between allocated requirements 
and capabilities identified in the weapons system catalog developed during the research 
phase provides a current capability overview. Finally, documentation of capability gaps 
highlights them for the proposed system architecture. 
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H. CHAPTER I SUMMARY 
The U.S. Navy mining capability is long overdue for an upgrade. While the 
technology to improve mining capability exists, no efforts are underway to integrate these 
technologies into a better weapon. This project examines a path forward for integrating 
current technologies such as autonomous transit, navigation, and detonation. Extensive 
research provides an understanding of the current capability gaps in naval mining. A 
thorough investigation of current systems and their inability to meet the needs leads to an 
analysis of alternatives designed to produce a set of potential candidate systems and 
improvements to existing systems. 
 Each chapter builds on the previous as the sections lead to a final, detailed path. 
Chapter II describes stakeholders important to the project and the associated interests in 
developing MADMAN. Next, the requirements demonstrate alignment to overarching 
objectives serving the needs of the stakeholders. The chapter concludes by highlighting 
available technology and providing a current capability assessment. Chapter III details 
the design of MADMAN by beginning at a high-level view and then decomposing the 
system into subsystems. This decomposition provides a foundation for developing a 
concept of operations, mission scenarios, and vignettes. These artifacts describe the 
functionality of the system in an operational environment. Chapter IV begins with a look 
at the functional architecture of MADMAN and then provides a detailed explanation of 
the modeling and simulation used in this project. Chapter IV also describes the methods 
for qualifying the system in quantitative terms. Chapter V assesses the characteristics of 
each design option and summarizes the comparative viability of each option through 
statistical analysis. Finally, Chapter VI provides conclusions on the leading alternative 
and recommendations from the team toward future development. 
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Reaching a defined problem statement is always difficult. “It is not uncommon to 
first identify some ‘perceived’ need which, in the end, doesn’t solve the problem at hand” 
(Blanchard and Fabrycky 2011). Only through multiple iterations of problem statement 
redefinition can a concise focus on actual needs result in a system foundation that is 
realistic and supported by all stakeholders. This section breaks apart that process and 
examines stakeholder wants top-level requirements, and an overview of the current 
capabilities as they relate to the MADMAN.  
A. STAKEHOLDERS ANALYSIS 
Stakeholder analysis is a valuable step in the problem definition phase. 
Stakeholder analysis examines the expressed and implied needs required of the 
MADMAN. The first task of the stakeholder analysis is to identify the project’s 
stakeholders and their interests associated with the study. After identifying the 
stakeholders, each separates into primary, secondary, or tertiary categories. Weighting for 
primary stakeholders’ is highest among the three categories.  
It was necessary to obtain stakeholder needs through extensive documentation 
review. Table 1 provides a summary of several key stakeholders for the MADMAN 
mission. Stakeholder categorization assisted in the prioritization of stakeholder feedback 
and the level of influence and involvement of each in the MADMAN effort. Table 1 
provides an overview of the identified stakeholders, primitive needs/wants, 
goals/objectives and brief concerns of each.  
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Table 1. Primary Stakeholders Analysis Overview. 
Bold text denotes linkage to key objectives for the MADMAN system.  
 
Priority Stakeholder Primitive Needs/Wants Concerns 
Primary Operators  
- Remotely controlled 
- Pre-programming of missions 
- Mission termination 
- Shallow water, active warzone 
accessible 




U.S. Navy  
- Autonomy 
- Mine delivery and deployment 
- Identification of alternatives 
- Evaluation of alternatives 
- Application for future expansion 






Department of Defense  
- National security: Counter 
detection by enemy forces 
- Defense of waterways 
- Low cost with high effectiveness 
- Survivability 




- Design and manufacturing of 





Enemy Forces  - Deny passage - Effectiveness 
Consortium for Robotics 
and Unmanned Systems 
Education and Research 
(CRUSER) 
- Advancement of autonomy 




- System reliability 
- System functionality 
- Successful integration of system 
components 
- Poor system 
integration  
- Requirements not 
properly defined/met 
Trainers and Maintainers - Ease of operation and maintenance - Parts and materials costs 
- Maintainability 
- Parts obsolescence 
Environmental 
Protection Agency 
- Protection of environment, humans, 




- Maritime data reading potential 




Defense Council - Protection of underwater wildlife 
- System maritime 
environmental 
influence 
Beneficiaries - Military and commercial traffic - Safe passage 
- Conducting 
missions in a safe 
environment 
- Safe transportation  
Taxpayers - Protection of naval forces and domestic safety - Value of investment 
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While stakeholders have varying perspectives, motives, and requirements, the 
majority of stakeholders have a direct interest in placing underwater mines successfully 
and safely. The key overall need is to identify and evaluate the alternatives addressing the 
inherent and inordinate risk to delivery units and avoiding detection by enemy forces.   
1. Primary Stakeholders
The central stakeholders for this project are system operators. Their interest is in 
addressing the lack of a fully autonomous UUV mining capability. The National 
Research Council (2000) states, “Continued dialogue between naval operators and 
academic scientists is essential to ensure that researchers are aware of the current needs 
and capabilities of the mine warfare community.” The chief goal of the primary 
stakeholders is a structured and complete assessment of the necessary technical 
capabilities needed to develop a fully autonomous mining system that significantly 
reduces or eliminates danger to ships, delivery units, and personnel. Primary stakeholders 
are also interested in ensuring analysis includes the necessary attributes and mine 
payloads of the vehicles, possible mission sets, the range of operations, and an effective 
concept of operations.  
Deriving operator needs from the National Academic Press publication allows 
insight into why a mine with remote controlled activation and deactivation and mission 
deactivation is necessary (National Research Council 2000). Operator needs directly link 
to the fundamental aspects of having an autonomous mine delivery system with the 
ability to remotely deactivate as necessary.  
2. Secondary Stakeholders
Literature research provides insight into secondary stakeholders’ primitive needs 
(Blanchard and Fabrycky 2011). Secondary stakeholders consist of the U.S. Navy, 
Department of Defense, trainers and maintainers, designers, developers and 
manufacturers, and CRUSER. These stakeholders have varying needs and concerns. 
Among the concerns discussed in Table 1, a deployable, viable, autonomous mine 
delivery and deployment system is important to the secondary stakeholders. 
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3. Tertiary Stakeholders 
Tertiary stakeholders consist of engineers, trainers, and maintainers, the 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), the Natural Resources Defense Council, 
beneficiaries, and taxpayers. Direct communication does not occur with silent 
stakeholders, thus extensive research provides insight into the role each stakeholder plays 
in this evaluation and the primitive needs and wants.  
A report from the Defense Science Board (2016) provides the basis for 
establishing tertiary stakeholders and associated desires for reliability, functionality, and 
integration. Tertiary stakeholders also support an emphasis on protecting the natural 
undersea wildlife and oceans from contamination (Office of the Under Secretary of 
Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics 2016). Oceanography and Mine 
Warfare (2000) also provided needs for having a deployable autonomous delivery and 
deployment system with reduced risk to delivery units and armed forces personnel.   
B. TOP-LEVEL OBJECTIVES 
 The objectives for MADMAN derives from the stakeholders’ primitive needs. 
These primitive needs started as simple statements of desired abilities and functions for a 
mining system. To develop a clear path, these statements translate into key traceable and 
realistic objectives. Table 2 illustrates the translation from primitive needs to the resulting 
overall objectives for MADMAN’s architecture. Stakeholders’ primary concern is a 
general need for more autonomy and stealth capabilities. However, discussion determined 
that there would be six distinct needs resulting in six key objectives. Mapping top-level 
objectives to stakeholder primitive needs allow for a clear association of the necessary 
functions needed to meet requirements and defining the top-level objectives. – 
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Table 2. Top-Level Objectives 
Primitive Need Key Objectives 
Shallow water, active warzone accessible Access littoral target area 
Prevent enemy interference with mission Avoid detection 
Should fit on current naval vessel Deployable 
Can arm the system and deactivate Control mission start and abort 
More autonomy throughout the system Reduce or remove human risk 
Keep costs low with high effectiveness Suitable 
Successful conduct of effective autonomous mine warfare hinges on the 
accomplishment of these six key objectives. First, the system must provide access to 
target areas; the system must be capable of reaching enemy littoral regions under its own 
power and guidance. Second, the system must avoid enemy detection by the enemy by 
presenting a small—or nonexistent—radar cross section and emitting little or no acoustic 
signature. Third, the system must fit within current naval vessels and not require 
additional equipment to deploy mines to the designated mining area.  
The system must also arm and disarm mines per operator commands and, when 
armed, must attack detected targets. Similarly, the system must dispose of mines when 
commanded by disabling explosives in place after verification of an environment free of 
commercial and civilian traffic. As compared to current MIW capabilities, the system 
must achieve all of these goals with a significant reduction or elimination of risk to 
human life. This reduction comes from adding in autonomous features to the system, 
preventing the need for human interaction in multiple parts of the mission activity. 
Finally, the system must meet all of these goals with acceptable suitability traits, such as 
system reliability, operational availability, and the probability of mission success. 
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C. TOP-LEVEL REQUIREMENTS (EFFECTIVE NEEDS)   
To build the right system, combining stakeholder analysis, primitive needs and 
the resulting top-level objectives lead to the development of defined requirements for the 
system. These requirements provide a path to system specification. All lower-level 
elements of the system are traceable up to these requirements, providing stakeholder 
needs satisfaction and a correctly built system. Table 3 lists these requirements.  
Table 3.   Top-Level Requirements 
MADMAN System Requirements 
The system shall be capable of entering shallow littoral areas 
The system shall avoid detection while in the active mission area 
The system shall be deployable 
The system shall be able to accept engage and disengage commands 
The system shall autonomously navigate to a pre-defined destination 
The system shall use existing naval mine warhead and influence systems 
The system shall reduce the risk of human casualty 
 
The first requirement is the capability to enter shallow littoral areas. Entering 
shallow water requires a system of minimal size with the ability to maneuver, detonate, 
and meet proper distance requirements. In addition, it is important to understand the three 
major aspects of coastal environments when entering littoral areas. The National 
Research Council (2000) describes these three aspects as 1) 95% of the world's 
population lives within 600 miles of the sea, 2) 80% of all countries border the coast, and 
3) 80% of the world's capitals lie within 300 miles of a shoreline. Warfighters and 
METOC have special interest in these unique location deployments. It is critical to plan 
and execute mine warfare successfully. A key to this success lies in understanding that 
“virtually every environmental parameter in the dynamic near shore environment 
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influences military operations” (National Research Council 2000). This required shared 
knowledge facilitates necessary cooperation between these communities of interest.  
As the system enters the littoral area undetected, it must also avoid detection 
while in its designated area. One opportunity to meet this requirement is the use of low 
profile shapes mimicking creatures of the sea and attempting to stay within ambient 
noises during movement through the littoral areas. Ambient noise databases, such as the 
Historical Temporal Shipping database for commercial shipping supports the use for 
modeling discrete shipping noise, while the Ambient Noise Directionality Estimation 
System (ANDES) and Directional Ambient Noise Estimation System (DANES) models 
supports the use for the deep-water diffuse noise levels (National Academy of 
Engineering 2003). These databases allow for a distinction between seasonal trend noises 
like industrial fishing boats and the crashing of waves. The use of this database provides 
a better understanding of how to mask the acoustics of the mine propelling through 
littoral areas. 
The mine must be deployable from current Navy vessels. The system must 
conform to a size limitation for naval vessels, taking into account load weight, quantity, 
and on-vessel transportation. Be able to fit on a naval vessel and then reach a pre-
determined location for release. To support cost-effectiveness, there should be no special 
equipment required to move mines on naval vessels. The deployment operations should 
use current equipment on naval vessels to release mines for mission activity. Use of 
familiar equipment and on-vessel transport facilitates risk reduction through minimal 
human involvement. 
In addition to deployment, the engagement and disengagement process will 
require communication and human intervention to some degree. System operators must 
arm mines in preparation for its mission activity. Human intervention disarms or 
disengages the mine remotely once the mission activity concludes. These commands may 
come in any form, provided the mine responds in an acceptable period to prevent risk to 
non-adversary human life. The ability to arm the mine is critical to providing offensive 
capabilities; however, the ability to disengage and reengage can provide a means of safe 
passage for friendly forces through active mission areas. Disengage and reengage 
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functions may be considered a last resort because any weapon that was once live could 
pose risk that friendly vehicles may not be willing to accept.  
Once deployed, the mine transits to a target location autonomously using pre-
defined or dynamically updating navigation. No human involvement will be required for 
the mine to reach a target location. The mine will utilize existing methods for location 
determination. Autonomous vehicles of many forms provide propulsion, location, and 
obstacle avoidance capabilities required for such a transit. Before deployment, uploading 
topographical maps of the littoral area to the mines facilitates successful navigation and 
increases the chance of success. 
 Stakeholders desire the use of existing hardware and software elements to 
incorporate into the system. Reuse of current warheads and influence systems constrain 
the ability to produce new components. However, the reuse of elements provides greater 
supportability and maintainability for the overall system. Lastly and most importantly, 
the system shall reduce the risk of human casualty. Incorporating as many autonomous 
characteristics and functions within MADMAN reduces risk to human casualty.  
The seven high-level requirements incorporate mobility of the mines to establish 
verification and validation to specific design and development criteria early on in a 
project’s lifecycle. Early verification and validation of specific design and development 
criteria allow performance traceability of requirements while tailoring down to the 
subsystem level specifications. Requirement traceability captures the relationships 
between the requirements, specifications, and design. These seven system requirements 
will create the foundation for the project with lower level system requirements appearing in 
Chapter III of this capstone. 
D. CURRENT CAPABILITY ASSESSMENT   
A system’s primitive needs come from many different types of sources, and as 
their name implies, they have not yet matured into actual requirements. Many times, they 
come from a vision and stakeholders who may not understand the depth of their primitive 
needs. Additionally, there are situations where functionality or capability already exists in 
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some form. Examining the relationship between current capabilities and stakeholder 
needs allows for a better understanding of development feasibility.  
Presently, an autonomous mine delivery system does not exist, and none are in 
development. Previous mine acquisition programs of record are no longer operational.  
Among the programs was the Mk 67, an improved submarine-launched mobile mine 
(SLMM), the Littoral Sea Mine, a proposed replacement for the Mk 60, and a planned 
target detection device for Mk 71 to replace sensors and fusing options for the 
Quickstrike series of mines (National Research Council 2001). None of these programs 
incorporates the autonomous delivery of mines. Understanding the current naval 
capabilities in mining, propulsion, navigation, communications, influence, UUV/USV, 
detection, mine deployment, and autonomy allows determination of applicable 
capabilities that can meet system requirements. 
a. Mining Capabilities
United States naval mining capabilities are currently non-existent for autonomous 
delivery of sea mines. Current capabilities support air delivery of the Quickstrike series 
(Mk 62 (500 lb.), Mk 63 (1000 lb.), and Mk 65 (2300 lb.) mines. In combat, enemy 
forces will deploy aircraft and anti-aircraft batteries to prevent placement of mines. 
Additionally, when using the current deployment system to airdrop a mine, a human must 
fly the aircraft into contested zones, increasing the risk of attack from enemy anti-aircraft 
measures. Mine deployment precision is another issue faced by current Navy systems. 
While an aircraft can drop a weapon precisely in a particular area, the mine interacts with 
the water as it settles to its deployed location. A mine dropped from the air may not land 
on the seafloor at its intended location because sea currents interact with the mine as it 
falls from the surface.  
b. Propulsion Capabilities
Different underwater vehicles use different means of propulsion. Each existing 
vehicle or weapon presents an option for MADMAN’s means of transit. MADMAN 
could benefit from using current propulsion technology to make the required transit.  The 
U.S. Navy’s primary torpedo systems are the Mk 46 and Mk 54, air-dropped torpedoes 
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and the Mk 48 Advanced Capability (ADCAP), fired from submarines. All of these 
torpedoes use a swashplate piston engine fueled by OTTO Fuel. The range of these two 
torpedoes is limited to the amount of monopropellant fuel carried onboard 
(WeaponSystems.net 2002). When ignited, monopropellant fuel decomposes into hot gas, 
which supports driving the engine.  
Another example of U.S. naval torpedoes is the Mk 50 Barracuda, which is a 
lightweight anti-submarine warfare (ASW). The Mk 50 uses a different propulsion 
technique with a chemical storage system. This type of propulsion uses sulfur 
hexafluoride gas sprayed onto a block of lithium and produces a low radiated noise level 
due to no exhaust gasses (Pike 1998). Again, fuel tank capacity limits this propulsion 
system range.  
Before the Mk 48 ADCAP torpedo, U.S. submarines carried either the Mk 37 or 
the Mk 14 torpedoes. Each torpedo used different propulsion systems. The Mk 14 used an 
engine fueled by methanol and contained a pressurized air tank allowing the combustion 
engine to function underwater. The Mk 14’s limited range is due to the tanks required for 
both the methanol and the compressed air. The Mk 37 used silver-zinc batteries that 
connected to a two-speed electric motor. Using the electric motors for the Mk 37 greatly 
increased range of the U.S. torpedoes; however, when vibrated they could overheat and 
explode (Milford 1997). 
Most propulsion capabilities employ some form of motor or engine. However, an 
emerging technology allows the harvest of propulsive energy from current and wave 
motion. Wave Glider converts the ocean’s kinetic motion to move the system through the 
water as shown in Figure 9 Should the float also contain solar cells, the energy gathered 
can also power UUV propulsion and sensors (Manley and Wilcox 2010). The Wave 
Glider’s dependence on wave motion limits its motion to a slow speed through the ocean. 
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Figure 9. Wave Glider Principles of Operation. Source: Manley and Wilcox (2010). 
c. Navigation Capabilities
One of the inherent requirements for a mining system is precise positioning at the 
deployment location. Navigation is a critical function that ensures that friendly forces 
know the mine location. Precise positioning allows friendly forces to transit near or even 
through a mined area, while at the same time denying the enemy force access to the same 
areas.   
Many inertial navigation systems provide the added option of using external fix 
sources such as GPS to determine location. Inertial navigation is most likely the best 
source to ensure covert delivery. While inertial navigation varies in precision, as the 
navigation tool becomes more precise, it also becomes more expensive. United States 
submarines use one of two primary methods to determine position while underway; either 
electrostatic gyro navigation (ESGN) or a ring laser gyro navigation (RLGN). The 
relatively large size of the ESGN and RLGN prevents successfully deploying or 
transferring of smaller systems. Redundancy, which provides their capability for 
sustained operations, causes the large size of these systems. Torpedoes such as the 
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ADCAP utilize a turn count based dead reckoning system that determines position. Other 
forms of inertial navigation systems include fiber optic gyros, pendulous accelerometers, 
quartz rate sensors, and timing and inertial measurement sensors. The inertial 
measurement method’s short deployment life cycle and the potential to use outside 
sources for portions of the deployment allows for possibly scaling down the size of 
existing systems used on submarines (King 2017). 
d. Communications 
United States Navy submarines communicate covertly using multiple methods. 
Figure 10 shows different frequency bands used by submarines (Pike 2011). While range, 
detectability, and actual frequencies are classified, a multitude of active radio 
communication systems exists. The system requires either an antenna system or a 
deployable buoy for the required position report.  
 
Figure 10. Submarine Communication Capabilities. Source: Pike (2011).  
Extremely low frequency (ELF) used during the Cold War, provided 
communication with Polaris class submarines. ELF requires a large infrastructure no 
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longer available for submarines today (Altget n.d.). Submarines currently use very low 
frequency (VLF) for communications; however, depth and environmental effects limits 
VLF. VLF, although a viable method of communication, presents limitations for the 
system’s operational capability.  
Acoustic underwater communication sends and receives information under water 
but also requires hydrophones. Underwater acoustic communication presents some 
challenges that may affect operational capability, but its small infrastructure makes this a 
viable alternative to radio frequency communications. The ocean environment affects 
underwater communication greatly. Water transmits sound better than air. While the 
communication range is greater, it is important to address the detrimental effects of 
bottom type, salinity, water depth, and multi-path propagation. The characteristics of the 
undersea environment heavily influence underwater communications. The undersea 
environment limits the long-range ability to activate the system since it requires a 
transmitter nearby. The use of an underwater telephone provides a suitable alternative for 
addressing long-range communications.  
The AN/WQC-2 underwater telephone system is a good example of militarized 
long-range underwater communication (Shinego et al. 2001) but primarily used on 
manned submarines and surface ships. Another viable option includes the man-portable 
systems employed by divers.  
Although the demonstration of radio frequency (RF) communications at very 
shallow depths and short separations between UUVs, RF-based UUV communication is 
not practical. UUVs are constrained to use of acoustic data links for primary 
communications. Transducers sized for UUVs are typically constrained to higher 
frequencies—10 kHz and above—and half-duplex protocols in which the UUV cannot 
simultaneously receive and transmit (Partana, Kurosea, and Levine 2016). 
 USVs and Seagliders can provide satellite-to-seafloor communications links; 
USVs support continuous satellite links, while Seagliders may only provide intermittent 
satellite communication while at or near the surface. Monterey Bay Aquarium Research 
Institute (MBARI) has demonstrated a Wave Glider-based communications “hot spot” 
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that employed both acoustic and Wi-Fi modems to communicate with both submerged 
and surfaced UUVs. Although MBARI’s hotspot used a traditional cellular phone 
network for shore communications, use of a satellite link is feasible (Hanrahan and 
Cardoza 2017). 
e. Influence 
United States naval mines employ different influence types. Influence mines 
utilize acoustic, magnetic/seismic, pressure, or a combination of detonation types. 
CAPTOR (a torpedo type for the uninitiated) uses acoustic influence while the MK 67 
SLMM uses magnetic/seismic influence, and the Quickstrike series uses a combination of 
magnetically/seismically and pressure influence. Other countries use multiple influence 
mines such as Spain’s MINEA and Italy’s MURENA mines, which both use pressure, 
acoustic, and magnetic/seismic influence triggers (RWM S.p.A. 2013) (Electronica 
Submarina SAES 2011). Previous exercises demonstrate these influence types not only 
exist but also function as intended. An important aspect not yet in development is the 
discrimination of targets from traffic before detonation. Table 4 provides an overview of 
the common U.S. naval mine types from 1890 to 2010.  
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Table 4. Mine Applicability and Influence. 
Name Type/Influence Period of Use 
MK2/MK3 Moored/Contact 1890-1917 
MK6 Moored/Contact 1914-1964 
MK16 Moored/Contact 1917-1945 
MK13/MK25 Bottom/Magnetic 1940-1974 
MK18 Bottom/Magnetic 1950s 
MK49 Bottom/Magnetic/Acoustic/Pressure 1951-1960s 
MK52 Modular/Acoustic/Magnetic/Pressure 1954-1978 
MK55 Bottom/Magnetic 1961-1980s 
MK56 Moored/Magnetic 1966-Present Day 
Destructor (DST) Converted Air-Dropped 
Bomb/Magnetic/Acoustic 
1967-1985 






MK67 SLMM Bottom Torpedo/ 
Magnetic/Seismic 
1983-2010 
Adapted from Friedman (1998) and Hartshorn (2011). 
Green shaded denotes the influence types presently used. 
Presently, mines utilize three influence types consisting of moored/magnetic, 
moored torpedo/acoustic, and bottom/magnetic/pressure/acoustic.  
f. Current UUV/USV Capabilities
It may be necessary to employ unmanned surface vehicles (USVs) as well as 
UUVs to achieve required navigation and communications capabilities. Figure 11 
compares trends in key performance characteristics across applicable classes of 
unmanned surface and underwater vehicles. The subsections below further describe 
current UUV capabilities and limitations in achieving top-level objectives. 
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Figure 11. Comparison of Current and Near-Term Unmanned Marine Vehicle 
Capabilities 
Commercial and research UUV launch and recovery operations generally use a 
manned surface vehicle or a dock. Neither of these platforms is appropriate for the 
MADMAN solution, as they would require direct exposure of humans to enemy attack 
during mine deployment. Renilson (2014) proposed a simple recovery method using a 
catching mechanism connected by wire to a submarine moving forward. A proposed 
“wing” would steer the catching mechanism to contact the UUV as the submarine 
traveled past it (Renilson 2014).  
An alternative approach, proposed by Barlow and Hardy, would extend a 
recovery arm from a torpedo tube to capture the UUV and retract the UUV into the 
torpedo tube (Barlow and Hardy 2008). Either of these techniques may be applicable not 
only to large named submarines but also to larger UUVs that carry mines into littoral 
regions. 
The Virginia class submarine USS North Dakota (SSN-784) in 2015 first 
demonstrated the submarine-based underwater launch and recovery of a REMUS 600 
UUV (Gady 2015). This demonstration likely marked the first field demonstration of the 
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Virginia class submarine compatible, can launch and retrieve UUVs up to 1.5 m in 
diameter, 7 meters in length, and 13,600 kg in mass (Naval Drones 2017). It is notable 
that the REMUS 600’s 21-inch diameter could also enable the use of one of the Virginia 
class’s four standard torpedo tubes for launch (Vandenberg 2010). 
Figure 12. Universal Launch and Recovery Module. Source:  Navaldrones.com. 
The UUV navigation system relies on inertial navigation system (INS) instrument 
suites. Current INSs, when paired with Doppler Velocity Log systems, demonstrate a 
position error of approximately 2% of the distance traveled (Tang et al. 2013). Thus, 
longer deployment reaches will incur greater errors in the distribution of mines within the 
target region. External navigational references have demonstrated improved navigation. 
USVs equipped with GPS equipment may provide navigational references. The Defense 
Advanced Research Projects Agency has initiated an effort to develop an underwater 
equivalent of the GPS navigational capability.  
The proposed Positioning System for Deep Ocean Navigation (POSYDON) 
would provide fixed reference points that emit acoustic signals to determine position 
relative to those fixed references. Such a system may provide a distinct advantage by 
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allowing a UUV to determine its precise location without emitting any detectable signal 
of its own (Draper Labs 2016). 
g. Detection Avoidance 
It is possible to detect system components at or near the surface by visual or radar 
means. Below the surface, acoustic signatures from UUV propulsion and 
communications systems may be detectable. Communications with external assets such 
as aircraft, satellites, and other surface craft may require vehicles that can operate at or 
near the surface. However, this communications capability comes at the increased risk of 
visual or radar detection due to the exposed surface area of the vehicle. Small USVs and 
Wave Glider’s present an exposed cross section of a few square meters or less—orders of 
magnitude less than any manned surface vehicle or the Anti-Submarine Warfare 
Continuous Trail Unmanned Vessel (ACTUV) USV. Seagliders further reduce surface 
exposure by surfacing only briefly before diving below the waterline. This temporary 
resurfacing can support periodic, but not continuous; communication links to navigation 
beacons and other external systems. 
To avoid detection underwater, the UUV must also minimize its acoustic 
signature. Of particular concern are vehicle-to-vehicle communications singing acoustic 
modems. These communications may serve as a clear sign of approaching UUVs, alerting 
enemy forces before mines are in place. A Norwegian test of covert acoustic modem 
communications demonstrated communication across a 9 km distance using difficult to 
detect modulations in the range of 1.5 to 5.1 kHz (Van Walree et al. 2018). 
h. Mine Deployment Capabilities 
Mine deployment involves the transport and accurate placement of a warhead in a 
specific target area. Key capabilities supporting this objective are the carrying capacity to 
accommodate the warhead payload, the endurance to travel the required distance, and the 
ability to navigate precisely. 
UUV payload capacity decreases as overall vehicle size decreases. Vehicle speed 
and range also tend to decrease with decreasing vehicle size. Most naval mines use a 
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warhead section of 150 kg or greater mass; this significant payload mass may exceed the 
capability of most small-to-medium size UUVs. Technology improvements in propulsion 
efficiency and energy storage density (battery capacity) may be necessary to enable 
conversion of a small, commercially available UUV into a mine with sufficient range. 
i. Autonomous Capabilities
Autonomous control software developed for the ACTUV has demonstrated the 
ability to identify collision risks and re-calculate vehicle trajectories to avoid such 
hazards on the surface (Antanitus 2016). Analogous projects for UUV swarms have 
demonstrated not only collision avoidance capabilities but also the ability to coordinate 
swarm motion to meet a common goal.  
A group of UUVs traveling along a similar trajectory constitutes a swarm. Swarm 
control focuses on cooperative navigation and communication to ensure that each mine 
avoids collision with objects (including geologic features, biologics, and other vehicles), 
arrives at its target location, and can maintain communications capability. 
Research into the behavior and control of such UUV swarms has focused on a 
mission such as underwater search and monitoring; these missions typically rely on a 
small USV as a navigation reference and communications relay. The CoCoRo projects 
studied the combined capabilities of multiple identical UUVs with the goal of “self-
organization” to cooperatively complete tasks. Such self-organization may provide a 
benchmark for the definition of realizable goals (Schmickl 2011). Swarm control research 
in other domains may be applicable as well. Technology demonstrations using Unmanned 
Aerial Vehicle (UAV) and small satellite systems have proven basic cooperative 
navigation, communication, and command and control techniques.  
Reliability in autonomous vehicles remains a challenge. A recent study of failure 
rates in commercially available REMUS 100 UUVs discovered a mean time between 
failure (MTBF) of 1 to 1.5 hours and a mean distance traveled between failures of 
approximately 8 km (Griffiths et al. 2009). The REMUS 100 UV is a relatively simple 
UUV, however complex naval mine placement systems may be even more susceptible to 
failures. 
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Although advanced onboard fault management software may improve vehicle 
reliability, expansion of a system to include multiple such vehicles can still experience a 
significant failure rate. A 2016 study found a wide range of MTBF values—from 50 to 
1000 hours—for highly autonomous marine vehicles systems (Brito et al. 2016). 
Achieving system suitability requires significant UUV reliability improvement. 
E. CHAPTER II SUMMARY 
To make MADMAN a mining system that meets or exceeds operational 
capabilities of traditional mines, effective mine delivery, navigation, propulsion, and 
communication become key. Traditional mining systems lack the autonomous capability 
to access the target area and deploy mines safely. Current technologies and systems offer 
leveraging capabilities providing a sufficient starting point for the MADMAN system. 
     The ability for MADMAN to deploy to its desired location autonomously 
could solely define MADMAN as a “smart mine” system. MADMAN must have the 
means to transit from the deployment site to the desired target location autonomously. 
Autonomously transiting requires the use of propulsion and navigation functions suitable 
for achieving mission requirements. Current capabilities may partially achieve some of 
MADMAN’s mission requirements, but no autonomous mine delivery system exists to 
achieve all of the requirements. 
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III. DESIGN
Stakeholder analysis provides a path toward development of a system through 
defining requirements and identifying top-level objectives of the system. Upon reaching 
an agreement on a set of objectives for the system, decomposition helps generate a clear 
picture of the final system. Many aspects of what the system will and should do drive the 
early stages of system development. 
It is at this early stage of the system life cycle that major decisions are 
made relative to adopting a specific design approach and related 
technology application. Accordingly, it is at this stage that the results of 
such decisions can have a great impact on the ultimate behavioral 
characteristics and life-cycle cost of a system. (Blanchard and Fabrycky 
2011) 
Developing a set of alternative systems for comparison helps reduce bias and 
avoid choosing a pre-conceived design. The decomposition effort begins by examining 
four distinctly different, albeit linked areas as defined.  
1. Visual depiction. The visual depiction provides a high-level visual graphic
of the system. In Department of Defense Architecture Framework syntax,
the operational viewpoint (OV-1) provides a graphical depiction to display
how the system functions operationally (Chief Information Officer U.S.
Department of Defense 2010). The OV-1 separates MADMAN’s potential
deployment options into three alternatives for reaching the target location.
2. Capabilities. The visual depiction helps identify system capabilities and
decomposes them down to essential parts of the system.
3. Operations. With the necessary capabilities identified, the concept of
operations, details the separate phases of operational activities within the
system.
4. Scenarios. Potential scenarios supports highlighting how the system
responds to internal and external influences while conducting a standard
mission.
A. OPERATIONAL VIEW (OV-1) DEVELOPMENT 
In the early stages of development, an OV-1 serves as a viewpoint that makes 
sense to all the stakeholder perspectives. “The intended usage of the OV-1 includes 
providing a tool for discussion and presentation” (Chief Information Officer U.S. 
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Department of Defense 2010). Multiple discussions and iterations of requirement 
definitions generated three unique OV-1 drawings.  
1. MADMAN Deployment Using UUV 
The first drawing, Figure 13, demonstrates a balance between stealth, safety, and 
speed using a UUV-delivered mine. 
 
Figure 13. MADMAN Deployment Using a UUV. 
In this viewpoint, the operator loads MADMAN onto a UUV from a carrier ship 
or submarine and then the UUV transports the mine into littoral waters where the mine 
autonomously reaches a set destination. The MADMAN may use active and passive 
communications between nearby submarines or satellite-linked buoys. Using a UUV 
ensures that personnel remain at a safe distance before the mine enters into contested 
waters. 
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2. MADMAN Deployment Using Wave Glider
Figure 14 depicts a viewpoint focused on stealth. Using wave glider technology, 
the delivery of the mine creates a minimal acoustic signature. The Wave Glider is also 
unmanned removing the risk to personnel. A drawback for using Wave Glider as a 
deployment method is the speed of delivery. While relatively silent, the technology uses 
the sea current to rise and fall to reach a destination, creating a longer path to mine 
placement in comparison to other alternatives. 
Figure 14. MADMAN Deployment Using Wave Glider. 
3. MADMAN Deployment Using Air Drop
Air dropping MADMAN into littoral waters as shown in Figure 15, is the most 




Figure 15. MADMAN Deployment Using Air Drop. 
Aircraft equipped with mines pass over or near littoral waters and release mines in 
the general area for deployment. Once entering the water, the mines autonomously reach 
their final destination for arming. An aircraft’s noise level combined with the mines 
striking the water creates a noticeable acoustic signature in a specific area making this a 
poor example of stealth. Additionally, pilots must get close enough to the intended 
minefield location for deployment, increasing personnel risk. This proximity increases 
the chance of enemy identification and response to the aircraft. 
These high-level operational views provide a broad perspective on the MADMAN 
system. While the principle of operation is visually clear, specifics regarding the 
functionality of the system are minimal. A single image does not detail system elements. 





B. CAPABILITY DEFINITION 
MADMAN’s defined scope guides high-level requirements previously discussed 
in Chapter I. Chapter II explored current capabilities for subsystems with the potential to 
exploit. The next step is identifying “…the characteristics of design that relate to the 
technical performance of the system; that is, the technical characteristics that are required 
for the system to accomplish its intended mission(s)” (Blanchard and Fabrycky 2011); 
(National Research Council 2001). The functional capability hierarchy provides an 
overview of the necessary capabilities for the MADMAN. By starting with higher-level 
capabilities, a clear picture shows where further decomposition may highlight what gaps 
may exist. Figure 16 identifies this capability hierarchy, consisting of navigation, 
deactivation, monitoring, detonation, propulsion, and communication. 
Figure 16. Capability Hierarchy of the MADMAN. 
1. Navigation
Early stakeholder analysis indicates that MADMAN’s design should include 
transit to the mission location autonomously. Multiple options exist for MADMAN to 
determine location, ranging from external fix sources such as GPS or inertial navigators. 
Regardless of the method employed, MADMAN must be able to determine its location 
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upon reaching the final deployment area within mission parameters to facilitate 
knowledge of the deployment sites by external entities, and recovery of MADMAN 
following the conclusion of its mission. The desire for communicating position data with 
the operational commander once MADMAN reaches its deployment location allows for 
real-time mission adjustment if necessary.  
2. Deactivation 
Autonomous deactivation of MADMAN provides a greater margin of safety to 
outside entities that might have to interact with the deployed system. Autonomous 
deactivation and activation will provide operational commanders flexibility to transit 
known mined areas during the conflict aiding in psychological warfare and increasing 
safety upon changes to the scope of armed conflict. Remote deactivation of MADMAN 
also improves safety for personnel deployed to deactivate and dispose of deployed 
systems with the added benefit of minimizing the time required to restore free navigation 
of the seas post-conflict. However, personnel would transit minefields only in an 
emergency regardless of claimed deactivation.  
3. Monitoring 
Autonomous monitoring systems support the storage and deployment of armed 
systems. Before deployment, MADMAN will perform self-checks of all internal critical 
subsystems. These systems will include the arming, fusing, and firing circuitry, 
navigation systems, portions of the propulsion systems, and communications. Satisfactory 
self-checks executed before deployment improve mission effectiveness by ensuring the 
reliability of stored and deployed systems.  
External monitoring systems are required as MADMAN interacts with its 
deployed environment. MADMAN continuously monitors for nautical vessels that meet 
its pre-programmed mission criteria for target ships. During the deployment phase of the 
mission, MADMAN will also have to navigate through the underwater environment 
avoiding detection by minimizing interaction with undersea objects.  
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4. Detonation
Historical purposes of mines lie in asymmetrical warfare. Autonomous detonation 
is a requirement for naval mines. The MADMAN will have the means of arming, fusing, 
and firing the installed explosives once it meets the monitoring systems mission 
thresholds. Depending on the pre-programmed mission parameters, MADMAN functions 
similarly to an anchored or deployed mine by in place detonation or by the deployment of 
an encapsulated torpedo to increase the range of the MADMAN’s mission effectiveness.  
5. Propulsion
The MADMAN requires the need to covertly mine areas behind enemy lines. 
Covert mining requires MADMAN to have a means of moving through the water-space 
undetected by outside entities. MADMAN requires the means of storing energy and 
employing that energy to move from the deployment area to the mission area. The 
MADMAN uses navigation systems to determine its location and autonomously changes 
the propulsion methods as needed to remain in its programmed mission area.   
6. Communications
Communications with MADMAN will occur in two different phases. Pre-
deployment communications will occur when personnel are preparing MADMAN for 
deployment. Personnel conducting preparations to include loading mission profiles up to 
the system monitor communications conducted during the pre-deployment phase via a 
hardwire connection to facilities. The MADMAN will autonomously upload self-ran test 
data and system status to the pre-deployment facilities upon connection.  
During the deployment phase, MADMAN will be capable of active and passive 
communications. Passive communications occurs when personnel are uploading mission 
parameters and system updates. Personnel conducting preparations to include loading 
mission profiles and system updates provides MADMAN the means of conducting active 
communications. The MADMAN will pass location data and activity autonomously to 
satellite communication systems upon reaching its deployed area. MADMAN 
continuously runs self-tests while deployed. Should MADMAN fail internal monitoring 
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tests, the option for active communication abilities to inform combatant commanders of 
mission failure should be in place. While deployed, MADMAN will also retain the ability 
to receive passive acoustic communications to facilitate the autonomous deactivation and 
activation of MADMAN.  
7. Capabilities Summary 
From defining requirements to decomposing capability taxonomy, a potential 
system begins to unfold. By highlighting each capability, it is clear that there are certain 
functions required to enable the system to achieve mission goals. From this breakdown of 
capabilities, a general design appears. This demonstration of capabilities provides a look 
at the hierarchy of elements; however, an important aspect of the design is the integration 
of these capabilities.   
C. SUBSYSTEM INTEGRATION DESCRIPTION 
Grouping the capabilities described in the previous section into four central 
systems and underlying subsystems allows for further delineation. By grouping the 
capabilities into four main systems, it is easier to develop a picture of how these systems 
relate to one another. Figure 17 highlights the main systems with the subsystems detailed 
within each of the four blocks.  
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Figure 17. MADMAN Subsystem Diagram. 
The mine laying system is crucial to ensuring accurate live mine placement and 
activation. The subsystems contained within mine laying must receive power to function. 
The sensor system will exchange data with the mine laying system to ensure that the 
mine arms at the appropriate time, and for the appropriate reasons. Minelaying also 
exchanges data with the communications system to determine appropriate signal 
reception for arming, and in the event of an emergency disarming. The power system 
provides power to the elements that require some form of power, which is critical to the 
success of the MADMAN. The power system does not receive any data from the 
minelaying system. However, both the sensors and communication systems provide data 
to the power system, triggering MADMAN to provide power for other systems.  
The sensors system determines when the MADMAN should perform autonomous 
actions. Identifying targets of any kind and performing system checks require power 
delivered from the power system. The sensors system will use the responses from the 
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sensors to provide data to the mine laying system and communications system. 
Additionally, it will receive data from these same two systems. The mine laying system 
will provide sensor data with kill confirmation or mine deactivation data. The 
communications system will provide the sensors system with updates to area maps, 
software, or mission details. The communications system, while one-way between 
external command systems during covert operations, remains bi-directional internally. 
The communications system will require power to send data between the other three 
systems. During non-covert operations, the communications system will additionally 
exchange data between external sources if needed. This system is critical to providing a 
link outside of the autonomous aspect of MADMAN for any situations requiring 
involvement beyond initial programming.  
A simple high-level list of requirements and capabilities does not refine needs to 
the point of reaching a design decision. Examination of the concept of operations for the 
MADMAN and potential mission scenarios is the next step toward agreeing on 
preferential system design and alternatives. 
D. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS  
MADMAN functions through four separate phases of operation: 1) pre-
deployment, 2) deployment, 3) engagement, and 4) post-engagement. The pre-
deployment phase includes all activities occurring before deployment of MADMAN. The 
deployment phase includes all activities occurring between deploying MADMAN from 
the unit that transported the system to the deployment site until MADMAN 
autonomously reaches the mission area. The engagement phase includes the activities that 
occur while MADMAN is in the mission area to include monitoring of the system and 
environment. The post-engagement phase includes either MADMAN communicating a 
status of “mission complete” or a loss of signal.  
E. MISSION SCENARIO 
The typical mission scenario consists of the elements identified in Figure 18.  
Each of the four missions has distinct functions associated with it.   
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Figure 18. Typical Mission Scenario. 
1. Pre-deployment Phase
During the pre-deployment phase, MADMAN is located onboard a manned 
vehicle in storage. The operator removes MADMAN from storage and transfers it to a 
transfer unit upon selection for mission activity. When installed in the transfer unit, 
MADMAN powers up upon installation and runs self-monitoring tests. If self-monitoring 
tests fail, MADMAN alerts operators of failed test and failure condition. Operators will 
then take appropriate troubleshooting actions to either correct the failure or select another 
MADMAN system.  
Following completion of initial self-monitoring, operators upload mission 
parameters to the MADMAN system utilizing compatible software. Mission parameters 
include the geographic waypoints and mission data set including target ship identification 
(acoustic, pressure, magnetic, and seismic influence parameters) and mission parameters 
(ship count, waypoints, deployment area coordinates, communication codes, crypto 
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communication data, and mission timeline). Following successful completion of data 
upload, MADMAN will remain installed on the transfer unit [an unmanned air/surface 
vehicle (UxV)] until reaching the deployment area and subsequent deployment of 
MADMAN.  
a. Decision to Start a Mission 
A mission begins when leadership provides a decision to start to the operator. 
This decision influences the mission-planning step with the necessary planning 
information.  
b. Mission Planning 
The mission-planning step includes identification of the launch dates, times, 
location, and purpose. The mission-planning phase also includes the pre-planning of 
software for its mission. 
c. Prepare for Launch 
Preparing for launch is crucial to the success of the mission. Mission parameters 
pre-programmed into the MADMAN ensure accuracy and the latest available data.  
2. Deployment Phase 
The transfer unit starts the deployment process. MADMAN, upon notification of 
impending deployment, obtains location data from the transfer unit, and other external 
sources. If MADMAN is unable to receive position data, operators attempt to correct the 
issue or delay deployment operators in the manned vehicle can relay changes to the UxV   
The MADMAN will run pre-deployment monitoring tests and must pass them before 
allowing deployment to continue. If MADMAN’s pre-deployment monitoring fails, 
operators can troubleshoot the issues before deployment. MADMAN must pass all pre-
deployment self-monitoring prior to deployment unless overridden by the operator.  
MADMAN deploys from the UxV into the water.  After deployment away from 
the UxV, MADMAN performs self-monitoring for all propulsion systems, mission-
critical systems, and arming functions. Should this self-monitoring fail, MADMAN can 
49 
self-destruct upon operator command. Upon successful completion of waterborne self-
monitoring, MADMAN will swim away from the transfer unit until obtainment of the 
minimum separation distance. After reaching minimum separation distance, and if pre-
mission data allows, the initial arming of the device will occur.  
MADMAN will autonomously transit through the water using the pre-loaded 
positional data and dead reckoning to make way to waypoints. It obtains an external fix at 
each waypoint if MADMAN has the means of obtaining external navigational fixes. 
MADMAN makes its way toward the mission area monitoring the environment via 
acoustic data and uses influence capabilities to avoid interaction with undersea obstacles. 
Once at the final waypoint, MADMAN reports its final position via active 
communications. If MADMAN is unable to obtain a required fix at any time, its internal 
position monitoring provides feedback indicating it is unable to maintain the programmed 
track and MADMAN self-destructs. MADMAN only self-destructs if it is within the safe 
distance required by the convention of biological diversity to assure civilian safety in these 
areas.   
During the transit, MADMAN needs to overcome ocean currents and sea 
temperatures. If MADMAN is unable to overcome environmental currents and sea 
temperature, MADMAN enters a holding pattern for 24 hours, continuously monitoring 
sea current. Once sea currents lower to the point at which MADMAN can resume track, 
MADMAN does so. If 24 hours elapse and MADMAN is unable to continue transit, 
MADMAN self-destructs. Self-destruct only occurs if MADMAN is cleared under 
international standards for Humanitarian Mine Clearance Operations from affecting 
ecosystems and non-threatening civilian bystanders near littoral areas, after 
communicating the inability to follow the programmed mission.  
a. Launch-Deploy
During the launch-deploy phase, MADMAN performs scenarios under simulation 
to assure the system is working properly before release from the UxV. The UxV assigns a 
bay for each MADMAN it carries along with any other issued equipment to complete the 
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mission. After the transfer of MADMAN onto the UxV, MADMAN accepts orders from 
the UxV. 
b. Monitoring 
MADMAN periodically monitors system status using the operator’s pre-
programmed parameters. While monitoring begins in the deployment phase, it continues 
throughout the engagement phase. Monitoring includes both internal MADMAN system 
components as well as external environment monitoring. Internal monitoring focuses on 
hardware and software checks performed throughout the deployment and engagement 
phases. External monitoring provides detection of adversarial and environmental factors.  
c. Communication 
As the UxV transits to its predetermined location, communications occur with the 
manned vehicles through the UxV. MADMAN only sends status updates to the UxV to 
provide assurance of proper configuration and ability to receive orders from the UxV. 
d. Propulsion 
At the designated location, the UxV releases MADMAN to begin transit to the 
preprogrammed location. Autonomous transit requires navigation and propulsion to work 
in conjunction with the monitoring function to reach its intended location. MADMAN 
must autonomously transit to its point of interest. During the transit phase, the mine will 
have a positioning system guiding as well as a programmed sensor that ensures it does 
not collide with other objects.  
e. Detect  
MADMAN uses its sensors to detect its surroundings and informs UxV that there 
is an obstruction in the way of the anchoring point. Once the team knows that MADMAN 
requires orders for deviation of the route, the mission continues.  
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(1) Detect Obstacles 
During this step, the mine works autonomously around the obstacle with constant 
communication to the UxV to understand location and status for rerouting. Once 
informed, MADMAN can begin detour recognition. 
(2) Detect Adversary 
In addition to obstacles, MADMAN continuously monitors the environment for 
adversaries. If MADMAN identifies an adversary, additional protocols trigger.  
f. Navigation
MADMAN navigates through the littoral area with the capability of being 
undetected throughout the mission. Navigation is the ability to sense, locate, and 
maneuver around obstacles.  
g. Anchor
Once MADMAN anchors to the sub-terrain surface, it relays a message of 
touchdown and requests activation of the mine. Once activation has concurred, 
MADMAN monitors influence capabilities such as acoustics, pressure, seismic, and 
magnetics to engage pre-programmed target class. 
3. Engagement Phase
After MADMAN reaches the final waypoint, it communicates its position. 
MADMAN completes the arming sequence and commences mission monitoring. Mission 
monitoring will include internal self-checks in addition to influence monitoring. During a 
critical failure, such as the inability to maintain power levels, MADMAN requires 
disposition if within the parameters under International Standards for Humanitarian Mine 
Clearance Operations. MADMAN continues to monitor acoustics, pressure, seismic, and 
magnetics.  It is necessary to program MADMAN for influence types to ensure it looks 
for a combination of influences according to target ship classes. Obtaining a combination 
of thresholds for a pre-programmed target class, MADMAN deploys the encapsulated 
torpedo to explode under the target ship. While in the mission area, MADMAN will also 
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monitor for acoustic deactivation signals, either the signal to deactivate for a moment 
allowing friendly forces to transit the area or an end of mission signal discussed in the 
post-engagement phase.  
a. Complete Mission 
MADMAN’s three primary missions: 1) Detonate, 2) Deactivate, and 3) Self 
Destruct contributes to different objectives.  
(1) Detonation 
 The purpose of detonation is to cause damage or destroy an adversarial ship or 
submarine. Detonation occurs in response to input received from detection systems to 
arm, fuse, and fire the installed explosives after meeting the monitoring systems’ mission 
thresholds.  
4. Post-engagement Phase 
The post-engagement phase begins at the conclusion of the engagement phase. If 
MADMAN loses communication system operators confirm mission status before 
proceeding. 
a. Confirmation of Mission Complete  
Confirmation of mission complete occurs when there is a loss of signal, due to the 
successful execution of mission when self-destructing or verification of mine deactivation 
or disabling.  
(1) Deactivate 
The deactivate mission requires MADMAN to disable a mine allowing U.S. 
forces to control the scale of warfare. By deactivating the mine, U.S. forces can transit 
the minefields safely for access to and deception from enemy forces. After remote 
deactivation, reactivation can occur by system operators. Deactivation occurs when the 
firing system components no longer receive a signal from the arming device.  
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(2) Self-destruct 
International standards for humanitarian mine clearance operations include 
disposal and destruction of the mine far from humans. It may be necessary to remove the 
mine from the littoral area if self-destruct is not an option in the area. This decision, made 
before deployment, consists of establishing preprogrammed routes so that the mine would 
detach from the anchor and move to a cleared location for self-destruction. Self-destruct 
is an option when there is no longer a need for the mine.  
5. End of Mission
After the mission is complete, data and analysis begin supporting the reporting 
phase. It is necessary to assess the execution of MADMAN throughout all phases to 
highlight any issues that may occur. Various alternatives may occur during MADMAN 
mission, so it is necessary to consider vignettes throughout execution.  
F. VIGNETTES 
The following two vignettes provide the basis for developing the concept of 
operations.   
1. Vignette 1 – Obstacle Avoidance
During the transit portion, MADMAN detects an obstacle. Using a preplanned 
alternate route, MADMAN attempts maneuvering around the obstacle and is not 
successful. If the preprogrammed detour setting cannot execute, it reverts course. 
MADMAN communicates with the UxV to determine the best route to proceed.  Once 
programmed into MADMAN, the positioning system takes over and creates an alternate 
route. Once MADMAN proceeds on track, the mission can continue.  
2. Vignette 2 – Enemy Detection
During the detect function; MADMAN confirms the target as an adversary 
through ship identification. Detecting an adversary triggers the activation and release of 
the warhead toward the adversary target (military or commercial). Once the warhead has 
hit its target, loss of ship identification signals provide confirmation of the kill. If the 
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signals are still present, the delivery UxV recognizes it failed to eliminate the target. In 
this situation, the UxV commits other assets to eliminate the target or standby for 
information from the manned vehicle.  
G. CHAPTER III SUMMARY 
With specifics of the system understood, the system decomposes into a hierarchy 
of capabilities, describing what the MADMAN must do to reach mission success. This 
capability hierarchy highlights areas that should incorporate current technology and areas 
where gaps may exist, which feed alternatives analysis. The concept of operations 
provides detail of the MADMAN system to highlight performance from an operational 
capacity perspective. The concept of operations divides the mission into four phases 
consisting of a 1) pre-deployment phase, 2) deployment phase, 3) engagement phase, and 
4) post-engagement phase. These phases demonstrate where portions of the mission begin 
and end while displaying which segments contain autonomous features or requirements. 
Finally, mission scenarios provide examples of MADMAN reacting to potential 
situations during an active mission. 
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IV. FUNCTIONAL ANALYSIS
A. FUNCTIONAL ARCHITECTURE 
This chapter discusses the architectural approach employed in the development of 
MADMAN. The functional analysis begins with the incorporation of stakeholder needs 
into key objectives. A functional hierarchy decomposes the typical functions of the 
MADMAN and aligns them with requirements.  
1. Functional Flow Block Diagram (FFBD)
The functional flow block diagram depicted in Figure 19 allows the MADMAN to 
meet the mission described in the three versions of the OV-1.   
Figure 19. Functional Flow Block Diagram of MADMAN. 
The deployment chain shown in modeling and simulation contains three phases 1) 
Launch, 2) Transit, and 3) Anchoring), however, the FFBD must include the prelaunch 
activities and after-anchoring milestones. The FFBD shows these activities as “Download 
Mission Data” (DC0.1)) and “Activate Mine Functions” (DC4.1). Each phase of the 
FFBD depicts the following.  
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MADMAN’s pre-launch activities are external to MADMAN and occur before 
the Launch activity. Mission planners must determine the mission profile to include 
waypoint data. The operator enters waypoint data in a similar process to other 
autonomous platforms such as Tomahawk cruise missiles. Tomahawk’s vehicle changes 
modes/direction at assigned waypoints. For an underwater device such as MADMAN, 
each waypoint consists of a location, depth, and speed. Once MADMAN reaches the 
waypoint, MADMAN changes parameters as required to match the waypoint data. 
MADMAN uploads mission plan in DC0.1 at the commencement of the FFBD.  
Following mission data upload; MADMAN launches. DC1.1 shows the launch 
function for MADMAN. Modeling and Simulation show launch from multiple launchers; 
however, launch functions for MADMAN are the same regardless of which side of the 
launch vehicle the release occurs. The Launch phase includes any clearance maneuvers as 
well as the deployment of all sensors required for transit. Main motor start occurs 
following the launch, allowing MADMAN to maneuver away from the launching device. 
The launch phase ends, and the next phase begins when MADMAN enters the water and 
moves under its own force with all sensors activated.  
The Transit phase encompasses the major portion of the FFBD and contains the 
majority of all functions that must occur in the FFBD. The transit phase is a feedback 
loop to allow for external factors such as sea currents as well as external actors such as 
shipping, sea life, and debris in the water to interact with MADMAN as it follows its 
route. MADMAN commences transit by determining any direction changes from its 
previous feedback from Determining Navigational Position (DC2.6) or Detect Obstacles 
(DC2.3). Should DC2.6 state that MADMAN is off course; it will send required data to 
Change Direction (DC2.1) to force MADMAN to turn left or right. If DC2.3 senses an 
obstacle, it would override the input from DC2.6 into DC2.1 to cause a course change 
away from the object. DC2.1 could also cause MADMAN to change depth as required 
following reaching a new waypoint. After changing direction, if the navigational 
demands are large enough, MADMAN could also change speed to assist in regaining 
track or obstacle avoidance. Regardless, as MADMAN continues to transit, iterations of 
the transit functional loop DC2.3, DC2.6, “Perform Self Tests” (DC2.4), and “Perform 
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Preprogrammed Fault Correction” (DC2.5) continually run to detect issues. The transit 
loop will reiterate at the preprogrammed navigational interval specified by permission 
planners; this interval will be between 0.25-5min. Once DC2.6 determines that 
MADMAN has reached the anchor location, the transit loop ends, and the next phase 
commences.  
The Anchoring phase contains two distinct functions “Submerge MADMAN to 
Seabed” (DC3.1) and “Send Location Data” (DC3.2). DC3.1 causes MADMAN to 
sustain current depth using propulsion but causes a change in buoyancy resulting in 
MADMAN to sink to the bottom. Sinking to the bottom is not a recoverable function; 
once MADMAN is on the seabed, MADMAN will not move again until disposal. 
MADMAN will sink in such a fashion that all of the deployed sensors required to 
influence the mine are properly oriented to function. Following, DC3.1 and DC3.2 will 
release a communication device to transmit the final position of MADMAN back to 
combatant commanders.  
Completing successful release of the communication device, MADMAN enters 
the deployment phase. The deployment phase requires the activation of mine sensors with 
“Activate Mine Functions” (DC4.1). At this point, MADMAN completes its mission and 
the mine portion commences.  
B. MODELING AND SIMULATION 
There are three potential alternatives identified as candidate MADMAN systems. 
These alternatives provide different strengths and weaknesses. Identifying the most 
crucial elements for stakeholders allows modeling and simulation to reveal the system 
with the highest chance of success. “Models contain increasingly more mathematical and 
physical details of the system as the design portion of the development phase ends” 
(Buede 2009). This section presents mathematical details that demonstrate which 
alternatives perform better and why the results are meaningful to stakeholders.  
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1. Approach  
The deployment phase’s mathematical model uses Lusser’s product law. As 
illustrated in Figure 20, seven key activities occur as part of MADMAN mine 
deployment:  1) launch, 2) navigation, 3) propulsion, 4) recovery from internal fault, 5) 
obstacle avoidance, 6) countermeasures evasion, and 7) anchoring. 
 
Figure 20. The Deployment Phase. 
Pdeploy, the overall probability of success in completing deployment, models a 
chain of serial probabilities associated with each of the key activities. The resulting 




Figure 21. Deploy Chain. 
Lusser’s product law states “…if a system consists of a series of subsystems, each 

























reliability of the system is the product of reliabilities of the subsystems” (Bradley 2016). 
Thus, Pdeploy, the probability of success in completing the autonomous deployment, 
expresses the product of the probabilities of success for each activity included in 
deployment. 
Pdeploy = Plaunch x Pnav x Pprop x Pfault recover x Pavoid obstacle  x Pevade x Panchor 
where: 
• Plaunch represents the probability that MADMAN successfully launches
from its host vessel;
• Pnav represents the probability that MADMAN successfully navigates to a
point within the allowable range of the target destination;
• Pprop represents the probability that MADMAN successfully propels itself
from the launch location to the target deployment location;
• Pfault recover represents the probability that MADMAN successfully recovers
from any internal faults experienced during deployment;
• Pavoid obstacle represents the probability that MADMAN successfully avoids
obstacles in its path;
• Pevade represents the probability that MADMAN successfully avoids any
enemy attempts to destroy MADAMN or otherwise interfere with its
deployment; and
• Panchor represents the probability of successful attachment (anchoring) at
the target destination.
Each of these probabilities must be less than one; therefore, the overall probability 
of successful deployment will be less than the minimum value of any of these individual 
probabilities. 
2. Design Influences on Probabilities of Success
Characteristics of the selected MADMAN architecture influence the probability 
factors within the “deploy chain” above. 
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a. Launch 
Launching requires MADMAN to complete pre-deployment checks and perform 
personal internal checks that releases it for transit. Effective mining requires the launch 
and placement of multiple mines to populate the designated minefield. Launch failures 
that result in fouling of the launch mechanism can prevent the launch of additional mines, 
thereby risking success in deploying sufficient mine quantities to establish the intended 
minefield. The risk of launch failures can reduce with the use of multiple launch 
mechanisms.    
b. Navigate within tolerance 
As MADMAN moves to its destination undetected to stay on course and know 
where it is, is the next challenge. Navigation plays a great part in the transiting of this 
mine. The mine requires the precision of its location as well as awareness throughout the 
complete transits. The first influence is establishing an onboard inertial measurement 
system that consists of an inertial measurement unit and a laser-based vision system. 
Using low frequency, the vision system creates a position vector of the mine. On the 
other end of the spectrum, the inertial measurement system uses high frequency to 
measure accelerations and angular velocities. The result from this multisensory Kalman 
filter gives the mine a smooth, close loop steering control system (Karras 2007). Similar 
to obstacle avoidance, the ability to add swarm capabilities for mines communicate 
greatly improves the probability of an efficient navigation tool.  
A swarm can increase the chance of the MADMAN colliding with objects or even 
avoid obstacles by replicating path that other mines have taken. The last influence apart 
from these two features is GPS. Another attribute that can give higher probability is GPS, 
but it requires an outside source to assist in guiding. There are two types of GPS. Periodic 
GPS only captures MADMAN’s position at certain times during the mission or for a 
certain envelope of time. The other is dedicated GPS, which is designed for a specific 
mission. Either of the two systems would benefit the MADMAN mission. 
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c. Propel full distance
The movement of MADMAN is crucial due to time and distance limits. The mine 
requires time limits based on the battery life of the system and energy required run of the 
motor to its destination. Self-propelled mines started production in Russia in the 1970s; 
they had a capability of speed up to 42 knots and a traveling distance of over 17,000 
meters. This can be considered the standard measurements for a self-propelled mine with 
minor enhancement to the design. Today, the greatest creation is the use of bio mimicry 
propulsion. In propelling a system, friction absorbs the greatest portion of the energy. To 
eliminate most of the energy lost to friction, bio mimicry uses patterns and processes 
from the natural world. Bio mimicry provides advantages in terms of speed, 
maneuverability, efficiency, and stealth.  
d. Recover from faults
A successful launch produces a better result if the internal system components are 
equipped to assure mission success. Implementing an increase of software-based fault 
management increases the probability of recovering from internal system faults. The use 
of redundant systems can also increase the probability of mission success. With 
continued technological improvement, smaller, more powerful components can enable 
redundancy within MADMAN’s volume constraints.    
e. Avoid obstacles
Software and addition of redundancy measures address fault issues and creates a 
greater chance of success. To increase the probability of avoiding obstacles, the following 
types of software and hardware, working individually or in series, helps reduce the risk of 
failure. First, the use of cooperative navigation for MADMAN allows a swarm of 
MADMAN units to more effectively identify obstacles and seek out routes that avoid 
those obstacles. Another advantage of a swarm system is the ability to offset mines at a 
certain span of each to cover more area. This offset limits the chance of collision, based 
on each mine collecting data in transit. This data results in limiting the possibility of 
encountering unavoidable obstacles.  
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MADMAN mines may use embedded mapping features to deliver a more 
accurate understanding of its surrounding during transit. The uploaded terrain map 
assures a successful transit and reduces encounters of obstacles. The next best tool for 
increasing the probability of transit incorporates active sonar. “Active sonar transducers 
emit an acoustic signal or pulse of sound into the water. If an object is in the path of the 
sound pulse, the sound bounces off the object and returns an ‘echo’ to the sonar 
transducer” (U.S. Department of Commerce 2013). If the transducer receives signals, it 
can measure the strength of the signal. These real-time signals are the most accurate 
images obtained by the MADMAN during its mission.    
f. Evade countermeasures 
As MADMAN transits to its location, engineering analysis revealed the need for 
avoiding detection. Avoiding detection is highly required but can be difficult to achieve. 
The use of decoys attempts to reduce detection. As explained in Chapter III, decoys or 
dummy mines give a better chance for real mines to execute the release of the warhead. 
Also, decoys give the active mines a better chance to transit and get to their destination in 
the littoral area. Other evasion countermeasures include the use of quiet propulsion to 
assist in stealth. As sonar technologies improve, the chances of avoiding detection 
decrease. The use of systems similar to the Seaglider or Wave Glider does provide 
improved covert capabilities. Gliders transit at lower speeds, making them harder to 
detect and allowing them to stay operational for longer periods. Another beneficial 
feature of glider designs is their tendency to mimic the form and motion of sea life. The 
movement of the gliders mimics fish and other animals of the sea, which makes it 
difficult to distinguish between sea life and machinery. 
g. Anchor 
Once the transit completes, and the MADMAN reaches the target location, the 
mine needs to establish a fixed position. The mine must descend to the seabed, wait for 
detection of an adversary, and then deploy the warhead. To improve chances of the 
system executing the mission, MADMAN requires anchoring to the seabed. The first 
influence for fine-tuning is the weighted base anchor, which once descended releases a 
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weighted chain tethered to the mine. The conventional weighted anchor does improve the 
chances of staying in the proper location, but sea currents influence its course. Based on 
waves and current, anchors with a hooking mechanism provide a better chance for 
remaining at its required location. A variety of hooks are available for retaining the 
mine’s position. 
3. Modeling
The MADMAN performance model utilized various tools including Microsoft 
Excel and Real Options Valuation, Inc.’s Risk Simulator add-in to perform Monte Carlo 
analysis of the MADMAN deployment chain model. Using defined sets of deployment-
chain probability values, the model performs Bernoulli trials to determine the simulated 
outcomes for each key activity in the deployment chains. While single events, launch, 
navigation, propulsion, countermeasure evasion, and anchoring, obstacle avoidance and 
fault recovery occur multiple times during the deployment phase. To assess these 
successes in these recurring events, the model calculates an approximate number of each, 
based on “density” values for faults and obstacles. The model then uses a binomial 
distribution to model the success or failure of avoiding the number of obstacles 
encountered and recovering from all faults. 
The model repeats this simulation for each of 10 MADMAN units to determine 
the total number of successfully deployed MADMAN units per run. Given that 
MADMAN units share launch mechanisms (either one or two), the model requires the 
availability (not fouled) of at least a single launch mechanism to allow the launch of each 
MADMAN. Repeated Monte Carlo runs then establish the probability distribution and 
confidence interval for the number of successfully deployed units.  
a. Probability of successful launch (Plaunch)
The application of redundant launch systems influence Plaunch through modeling 
the use of one or two launchers (Figure 22 and Figure 23 respectively) to execute launch 
operations for the modeled set of mines. The model separately tracks the operational 
status (ready or fouled) for each launcher. When the model executes for a single launcher 
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scenario, launcher 1 status must be ready to allow the simulated mine to launch; a fouled 
indicator prevents the launch of the mine and any subsequently modeled mines.   
 
Figure 22. Single Launch Mechanism Model for Plaunch. 
 
Figure 23. Dual Launch Mechanism Model for Plaunch. 
The model assumes that any MADMAN unit can launch from any non-fouled 
launch mechanism and that, once a launch mechanism is fouled, recovery will not be 
quick enough to support the launch of additional MADMAN units. Thus, when a two-
launcher scenario runs, the model allows a mine launch as long as at least one of the 
launchers remains ready. When a single launcher scenario runs, the model ceases to 
launch 10 MADMAN units once a single launch fails and renders the launch mechanism 
fouled. Once confirming the availability of a launch mechanism, a single Bernoulli trial 
of probability Plaunch executes to determine the outcome of the launch attempt. If the 
launch is successful, the model continues to the assessment of the next activity, 
navigation. 
b. Probability of successful navigation (Pnav) 
The probability of successful navigation, modeled as another Bernoulli trial of 
probability, Pnav,  (Figure 24) where success defines the placement of the mine within the 








Figure 24. Probability of Successful Navigation (Pnav). 
Failure in this Bernoulli trial leads to a misplaced mine that cannot contribute to 
the minefield. It is important to consider that this strict assumption might not be correct; a 
misplaced mine could still contribute to the minefield but potentially not with the 
intended effectiveness.  Large navigation errors could even place the mine in a location 
that hinders blue force access. If navigation within this range is successful, the model 
continues to the assessment of the next activity, propulsion. 
c. Probability of successful propulsion (Pprop)
The probability of successful propulsion throughout the transit, Pprop   (Figure 25), 
assesses MADMAN’s ability maintain motion through the water for the full distance 
required to reach the designated target destination. 
Figure 25. Probability of Successful Propulsion (Pprop). 
The model performs a Bernoulli trial of probability Pprop to determine the outcome 
of the MADMAN unit’s propulsion. Failure in this Bernoulli trial leads to a lost mine that 
cannot contribute to the minefield. If navigation within this range is successful, the model 
continues to an assessment of the next activity, fault recovery. 
d. Probability of successful fault recovery (Pfault recover)
As previously stated, the MADMAN unit may experience one or more internal 
system failures during the deployment. System failures include a broad range of possible 
problems such as computer failure or spontaneous reboot, other data system errors, and 




probability factors, such as Pnav and Pprop, this simple model does not include such 
coupling factors. 
For each MADMAN unit, the model computes the time of the first fault using an 
exponential distribution function and an assumed MTBF. The model then compares the 
time of first fault to the deployment time to determine if the fault occurs during 
deployment. If so, the model performs a Bernoulli test to determine whether MADMAN 
successfully recovers from the fault as seen in Figure 26. 
For each MADMAN unit, the model computes the time of the first fault using an 
exponential distribution function and an assumed MTBF. The model then compares the 
time of first fault to the deployment time to determine if the fault occurs during 
deployment. If so, the model performs a Bernoulli test to determine whether MADMAN 
successfully recovers from the fault.   
 
Figure 26. Probability of Fault Recovery during Deployment. 
e. Probability of successful obstacle avoidance (Pavoid obstacle) 
The model assesses MADMAN’s ability to avoid obstacles using a technique 
similar to that described above for failure recovery. Given an input “obstacle density,” a 
normal distribution defining the number of obstacles encountered per unit distance, the 
model predicts “n”, the total number of obstacles that the MADMAN unit will encounter 
over the total distance traveled.   
For each MADMAN unit, the model computes a random number of obstacles, 
“f”, experienced across the deployment range “x” using an exponential distribution 
function. The model then uses a given probability of single obstacle avoidance, Pavoid single, 
computes navoid, the number of sequential obstacles that the MADMAN unit will 
successfully avoid before its first failed attempt as a random number of binomial 




A MADMAN unit must avoid all obstacles to complete deployment. Thus, navoid 
must be equal to or greater than n for a successful deployment. If this is the case, the 
model continues on to an assessment of the next activity, countermeasure avoidance. 
However, if navoid is less than n, the MADMAN unit fails and unable to contribute to the 
minefield.  
Figure 27. Probability Chain for Avoidance of Multiple Obstacle Avoidance. 
f. Probability of successful countermeasure evasion (Pervade countermeasures)
The model decomposes evasion of countermeasures into two activities and 
corresponding probabilities—detection avoidance, represented by P, and kill avoidance, 
represented by Pkill. Given these probability parameters, the model performs one or two 
Bernoulli trials. The first Bernoulli trial assesses the MADMAN unit’s success in 
avoiding detection. If the MADMAN unit fails to avoid detection, the model performs a 
second Bernoulli trial to determine the ability of a countermeasure weapon to intercept 
and “kill” the MADMAN unit. If the MADMAN avoids detection, launching 
countermeasures is not neccessary, and the model transitions to the assessment of the 
next activity, anchoring. 
This “one-shot” approach constitutes a very simple countermeasure model. Using 
models that are more sophisticated could study an enemy’s use of continuous searching. 
Continuous searching techniques increase MADMAN’s probability of detection as it 
approaches and allows time for multiple countermeasures. More sophisticated models 
may support a better understanding and lead to improving the possibility of not 










g. Probability of successful anchoring (Panchor) 
The model assumes that each MADMAN unit may make a single attempt to 
anchor at its target location. Given an input probability of success, the model performs a 
Bernoulli trial of probability Panchor to determine success or failure to anchor. If the 
MADMAN unit is successful in this Bernoulli trial and all previous activities during 
deployment, the mine counts as a part of the minefield. If MADMAN anchors 
unsuccessfully, it is considered lost and therefore not a part of the minefield. Anchoring 
is critical to the successful execution of MADMAN. In an unanchored condition, the 
MADMAN unit may become a hazard to surface or underwater craft causing 
unanticipated harm. 
Depending upon the system, there are multiple possibilities for probability results. 
The combination of these probabilities determines the overall probability of the 
deployment chain and overall effectiveness of the MADMAN. These probabilities 
potentially require individual increases to meet the overall system objective probability. 
An examination of the improvements needed allows the system to reach a goal 
probability, which addresses the aspects of system design that falls short and demands 
improvement.  
4. Simulation Results and Sensitivity Analysis 
Cost, complexity, and stakeholder desires affect the merit of increasing 
probability for a particular part of the deployment chain. The models presented in this 
paper represent a target endpoint of mission success probability. The individual 
probabilities that comprise the deployment chain represent segmented systems that need 
to perform at a certain level for MADMAN to reach an overall target probability. 
Developing an accurate account of the probabilities in these individual systems requires a 
sensitivity analysis. Each system requires a certain probability of success based upon the 
performance of other probabilities. Many of those systems carry different levels of 
importance or weights and as such, may mean more to a stakeholder. 
Initial simulation efforts focused on the assessment of mine deployment success 
rates for each of the three architecture alternatives. Key output parameters related to the 
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number of delivered mines—the 95% confidence level, the median value, and the mean 
value—provided a basis for comparison. Table 5 summarizes the assumed simulation 
input parameters for each design alternative. Note that several of these inputs describe the 
mission and environment, rather than the attributes of the design itself. Subsequent 
sensitivity analysis varied these mission and environment inputs to assess design 
architecture robustness in varying conditions. 
Table 5. Design Alternative Simulation Inputs. 
Characteristic Variable UUV Wave Glider 
Aircraft 
Probability of successful launch P1 launch 0.98 0.98 0.98 
Number of launch mechanisms nlaunchers 2 2 2 
Probability of navigating to target location 
within acceptable distance error 
Pnav 0.995 0.999 0.98 
Deployment distance, nm xtransit 12 25 3 
Probability of propulsion functions 
supporting deployment to full distance 
Pprop 0.99 0.999 0.99 
Cruise speed, knots vcruise 4 3 4 




0.99 0.9 0.99 
Obstacle density, mean, nm μobstacles/nm 0.1 0.1 0.1 
Obstacle density, standard deviation σobstacles/nm 0.02 0.02 0.02 
Probability of successfully recovering from 
a single fault 
P1 fault recover 0.99 0.98 0.99 
Mean time between failures (MTBF) hours MTBF 100 100 100 
Probability of evading detection Pevade detect 0.95 0.9 0.5 
Probability of evading intercept Pevade intercept 0.9 0.7 0.9 
Probability of successful anchoring Panchor 0.999 0.999 0.999 
The initial goal for these simulations was to achieve high-reliability 
demonstrating 95% confidence in the deployment of 10 mines. Simulations involved the 
deployment of 10 MADMAN units from one; two, or three launch mechanisms using 
each of the deployment architecture options (UUV, Wave Glider, and Aircraft). Table 6 
depicts the results from these simulations. 
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Table 6. Mines Delivered (out of 10) for Each Deployment Architecture Alternative. 
Category UUV Wave Glider Aircraft 
95% Confidence (right tail) 8 5 7 
Mean 9.440 7.228 8.992 
Standard Deviation 0.898 1.498 1.073 
Median 10 7 9 
 
Although the UUV alternative did exhibit a median of 10 mines deployed, the 
95% confidence level for UUV mine deployment was only eight. In fact, none of the 
alternatives supported a high confidence delivery of 10 mines. Additional simulation 
scenarios using 12, rather than 10 MADMAN, launches successfully achieved the high 
confidence delivery goal. Table 7 displays the results from these simulations. 
Table 7. Mines Delivered (out of 12) for Each Deployment Architecture Alternative. 
 UUV Wave Glider Aircraft 
95% Confidence (right tail) 10 6 9 
Mean 11.310 8.678 10.778 
Standard Deviation 1.110 1.674 1.258 
Median 12 9 11 
 
Figure 28 compares the histogram results for the 10 and 12 mine deployment 
simulations for each design alternative. 
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Figure 28. Comparison of Mine Deployment Results for Each Design Alternative. 
The UUV option performed well across the board, and those results allow for a 
detailed sensitivity analysis. In the following sections, the examination of each 
probability and potential alternate scenario offers a perspective of how each probability 
affects the overall system. Performing the sensitivity analysis on the UUV data provides 
results that identify behaviors that other alternatives would exhibit.  
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a. Launch 
The tornado analysis assists in the understanding of the effects of simulation 
output. Figure 29 presents the design performance factors and their influence on the 
overall success probability of the UUV-derived MADMAN design. 
 
Figure 29. Tornado Analysis of System Probabilities and Elements. 
The tornado analysis illustrates the relative impact of each design characteristic 
on overall system success probability through the size of corresponding bars. Red bars 
indicate the effect of design characteristic values less than those of the baseline case. 
Green bars indicate the effect of values greater than the baseline. Overall, the 
predominance of larger red bars over green bars indicates that most of the baseline design 
characteristic values are near the values that provide the highest probability of success. 
However, four characteristics—Pavoid 1 obstacle, Pprop, nlaunchers, and P1 launch—show some 
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potential to yield an increased probability of success if their values increase beyond those 
in the baseline case. The tornado analysis also reveals the potential that some design 
characteristic values could lower without significant impact on overall system 
performance. Such decreases could reduce development constraints and costs. The 
limitation of this diagram is that only focuses on the raw simulation results and does not 
account for stakeholder preference. However, this tool presents elements that need to 
factor into the final decision-making due to the level of influence on the actual system 
design. With these raw metrics providing insight into how the system behaves from a 
baseline perspective, the focus shifts to potential improvements in the design.  
a. Launch
The probability of launch success is the first step to building a minefield. Launch 
systems, proven in many cases of active warfare, suggests that the importance of 
improvement would be trivial. However, stakeholders would argue that without a 
successful launch, there is no minefield. Similar to the other subsystems, the launch 
system requires operational capability demonstration. Improving the launch system 
would likely not be realistic for the development of MADMAN and would require a 
separate endeavor. The simplest way to improve the probability to this system would be 
to add redundancy. Adding more than one redundant system would only increase the 
probability to a marginal degree Table 8 and add cost.  
Table 8. Marginal Increase for Redundant Launch Systems. 
2 Launchers at 0.98 Probability of 
Success 
3 Launchers at 0.98 Probability of 
Success 
(1-(1-0.98))2=0.999600 (1-(1-0.98))3=0.999992 
Figure 30 provides a graphical view of the sensitivity analysis conducted on both 
the probability of successful single launch and the number of available launch 
mechanisms. Sensitivity analysis further demonstrates that increasing beyond a single 
redundancy is not necessary in the case of the UUV.  
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Figure 30. Launcher Redundancy Sensitivity Analysis Example for UUV Option. 
b. Navigation 
The navigation system determines the success probability of MADMAN reaching 
the correct location. Various forms of automated navigation exist and operate properly. 
Unlike the launcher system, redundancy would not improve the probability of success for 
the navigation system. Improving the system may not be feasible from an effort 
perspective. With an allowable margin of error to reach a higher probability, the 
navigation system does not require perfection. The mines must still reach a general area 
for developing the minefield.  
The probability of successful navigation to a target destination (within an 
acceptable error), Pnav, demonstrated expected linear effect on the overall probability of 
success. As illustrated in Figure 31, even the highest possible Pnav values yielded a 
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Figure 31. Pnav Influence on Mine Deployment Success. 
The original UUV-based design alternative Pnav value of 0.995 then provided no 
clear advantage over a less challenging—and potentially costly—value of 0.99. 
c. Propulsion
The propulsion system is a critical part of the MADMAN deployment. This 
system moves the mines to a safe distance away from friendly forces and physically 
delivers them to the minefield. Multitudes of options for propulsion exist. Different levels 
of power and acoustic signature offer a range of potential components that system 
alternatives may or may not support. Improving the propulsion system may be feasible 
depending on the deployment system capability. Through engineering analysis, the 
propulsion system holds a heavy weight of importance because it combines reaching the 
target minefield and removing the mine from friendly proximity.   
Even with a high stakeholder importance, the probability of successful propulsion 
across the full deployment distance, Pprop, also demonstrated the expected linear effect on 
the overall probability of success. As illustrated in Figure 32, even the highest possible 
Pprop values yielded a maximum 95% confidence value of mines delivered of 10 out of 
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Figure 32. Pprop Influence on Mine Deployment Success. 
The original UUV-derived design alternative Pprop value of 0.99 demonstrated 
sufficient performance to support mission objectives and satisfy stakeholder needs.  
d. Obstacle Avoidance 
The ability for MADMAN to avoid obstacles combines distance traveled and a 
normal distribution of obstacles encountered per unit of distance traveled. In a perfect 
scenario, MADMAN would reach a target destination without encountering anything in 
the path to the minefield. In littoral waters, especially in combat zones, obstacles are 
more common than in open water, and the mines must have the capability to identify and 
avoid anything preventing reaching the target minefield location. The mine must avoid 
obstacles, but from a stakeholder perspective, the likelihood of encountering obstacles 
before reaching the minefield is relatively low in most situations; however, modeling 
high traffic areas was still necessary.  
The UUV design alternative required assessment for mine deployment capability 
across a range of obstacle densities. Modeling consisted of densities using a normal 
distribution with varying means and standard deviations. Results summarized in Figure 



























Pprop Influence on Mines Delivered
out of 10 out of 12
77 
Figure 33. Obstacle Density Influence on Mine Deployment Success. 
To address the reduced performance in these obstacle environments, additional 
simulations investigated the effects of increased Pavoid 1 obstacle (as high as 0.9999) on 
overall mission success. Simulations assumed an obstacle density function as a normal 
distribution of mean 0.4 objects/nm and standard deviation 0.08. Results from these 
assumptions appear in Figure 34. 
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This study reveals that an increase of Pavoid 1 obstacle to 0.9995 restored high 
confidence in successful delivery of 10 out of 12 mines in the dense obstacle 
environment. Although a low likelihood of obstacle density exists in most areas for 
developing a minefield, providing these numbers is important to understanding how the 
system would behave in a high-density environment. This behavior results in the actual 
mission environment density determining the importance of how well the system 
responds.  
a. Fault Recovery 
An autonomous mine will naturally contain a greater amount of electronics than a 
standard mine. These additional electronics translate to the potential for failure and faults. 
The model provides a combined MTBF for these elements. The higher the MTBF, the 
longer a system is more likely to operate without any faults or failures. Since all systems 
eventually fail to some degree, the model builds in response to this failure and provides a 
probability of recovering from failure. Additionally, the model takes into account the 
transit distance traveled. The combination of single fault recoverability, MTBF, and 
transit distance results in a complete system recovery probability. Available systems have 
a wide range of MTBF values, suggesting that there are many options available for 
improvement. If the distance traveled decreases by some method, this would improve the 
probability of success by lowering the chance of faults occurring. Stakeholders would see 
fault recovery as necessary; however, the main candidate for improvement is MTBF. 
With such a broad range of options, improving the deployment fault recovery could 
involve selecting an alternate device, requiring minimal research.  
Repeated simulation with varying probability of successful recovery from a single 
fault, P1 fault recover, indicated that with the default MTBF approximately two orders of 
magnitude greater than the mission duration, even significantly lowered probability 
values had no significant effect on mission outcomes as shown in Figure 35. 
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Figure 35. Influence of Reduced Probability of Fault Recovery at Baseline MTBF. 
Additional simulations targeted the identification of the lowered MTBF value at 
which the probability of fault recovery would influence mission performance. As 
illustrated in Figure 36, this critical minimum MTBF value was less than 10 hours, less 
than three times the planned mission duration. 
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From these results, a modest reduction in fault recovery probability while 
preserving overall mission performance, appeared possible. As illustrated in Figure 37, a 
reduction of P1 fault recover from 0.99 to 0.9 exhibited negligible impact on the number of 
delivered mines. 
 
Figure 37.  MTBF Sensitivity at Lowered Fault Recovery Probability. 
This performance requirement change presented an opportunity to reduce system 
development cost. While the ability to recover from faults is important to stakeholders, 
increasing beyond the stated baseline probability for recovery has almost no effect.  
b. Countermeasure Evasion 
Evading enemy forces is a key function for the MADMAN. This system 
probability incorporates the probability of detection and the probability of interception. 
This combination of probabilities is unique compared to other combinations because one 
is purely dependent on the other. If the mine avoids detection, interception cannot occur. 
Stakeholders are looking for a mine that has stealth capabilities. Decreasing the chance of 
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Simulations investigated the effects of varying MADMAN’s probability of 
evading detection. As illustrated in Figure 38, results suggested that decrease of Pevade 
detect to values as low as 0.85 had limited effect when MADMAN’s ability to evade 
intercept remained constant at 0.9. This constant of 0.9 represents a relatively low-
performance countermeasure (0.1 success rate). Under these conditions, Pevade detect 
values as low as 0.85 did not have a significant negative impact on the number of mines 
delivered. 
Figure 38. Influence of Varying Probability of Evading Detection on Mine Delivery. 
Additional simulations investigated performance against a more advanced 
countermeasures system with increased ability to intercept MADMAN. This increase in 
countermeasure ability reflects as a decreased probability that MADMAN would avoid 
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Figure 39. Influence of Varying Probability of Evading Detection against Advanced 
Intercept Systems. 
The figure suggests that, although MADMAN will experience a lower success 
rate against such an improved countermeasure, the effects of Pevade detection had a 
relatively weak influence on the outcome. The lack of influence results in considering 
alternate areas to improve toward achieving an overall mission probability of success.  
a. Anchoring 
The anchor system is required to keep the mine in place when developing the 
minefield. Improvement of this system would require re-design of current designs. While 
potentially feasible, stakeholders would not wish to expend valuable resources in 
developing new anchor systems. In the current state, the anchor system performs as 
needed and improvement would provide a small success probability improvement.  
Multiple simulations of UUV design alternative performance with varying Panchor 
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However, is illustrated in Figure 40, overall success in deploying 10 mines did not 
increase substantially with Panchor values greater than 0.99. 
Figure 40. Panchor Influence on Mine Deployment Success. 
Thus, there is the possibility that the initial design value of 0.999 is overly 
constraining. A Panchor value of 0.99 was determined to be sufficient to meet design goals, 
given an assumption that 10 of 12 mines deploy.  
5. Design Alternative Improvement
Given the sensitivity analysis results described above, a new generated design 
alternative takes advantage of noted opportunities to improve mine delivery performance. 
This design alternative incorporated opportunities to reduce strict performance 
requirements in the original design option where those requirements provided little or no 
increase in the number of mines deployed. These adjustments may allow system 
developers to focus more resources on factors that provide the most benefit. Table 9 
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Probability of successful launch P1 launch 0.99 
Number of launch mechanisms nlaunchers 2 
Probability of navigating to target location 
within acceptable distance error 
Pnav 0.99 
Deployment distance, nm xtransit 12 
Probability of propulsion functions supporting 
deployment to full distance 
Pprop  0.99 
Cruise speed, knots vcruise 4 










Mean time between failures (MTBF), hours MTBF 100 
Probability of evading detection Pevade detect 0.95 
Probability of successful anchoring Panchor 0.99 
 
This design alternative compared with the original UUV design in a series of 
simulations to demonstrate performance under three environments—the original design 
reference mission (low obstacle density and normal countermeasures capabilities), a 
denser obstacle environment, and pitted against more advanced countermeasures in  
Table 10. 
Table 10. Original and Modified UUV-Based MADMAN Design Performance in 
Original Design Reference Mission Comparison. 
Performance (12 MADMAN Units) Original  Modified 
95% Confidence (right tail) 10 10 
Mean 11.310 11.41 
Standard Deviation 1.110 0.7957 
Median 12 12 
 
Modeled obstacle density using a normal distribution with a mean of four 
obstacles/nm generates in the high obstacle density environment simulation. The results 
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presented in Table 11 reflect a significant advantage for the modified design alternative. 
Improved probability of obstacle avoidance restored MADMAN’s ability to deploy 10 of 
12 mines with high confidence, even in dense obstacle environments. 
Table 11. Original and Modified UUV-Based MADMAN Design Performance in High 
Obstacle Density Environment Comparison. 
Performance (12 MADMAN Units) Original  Modified 
95% Confidence (right tail) 4 10 
Mean 5.952 11.154 
Standard Deviation 1.623 0.933 
Median 6 11 
Creating an improved countermeasure simulation revealed that both designs 
assess against interceptor weapons with a 0.5 probability of intercepting and disabling the 
MADMAN unit. As shown in Table 12, the modified design alternative provided similar 
performance as that of the original UUV design option. 
Table 12. Original and Modified UUV-Based MADMAN Design Performance against 
Improved Countermeasures Comparison. 
Performance (12 MADMAN Units) Original  Modified 
95% Confidence (right tail) 9 9 
Mean 11.089 11.156 
Standard Deviation 1.191 0.925 
Median 11 11 
Thus, in all three environments, the performance of the modified alternative either 
met or exceeded that of the original UUV-based design. This modified version suggests 
that utilizing these probabilities serves to meet development costs, timelines, and 
feasibility targets. By analyzing the behaviors of these probabilities, a system with 
potential cost and resource savings emerged. By reaching these ideal probabilities, the 
alternative options compare their native probabilities to an ideal option. Ideal design 
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alternatives require measurement against satisfying overarching mission requirements 
and addressing stakeholder desires. 
C. CHAPTER IV SUMMARY 
A functional architecture emerges from the FFBD, detailing the behavior of the 
system. A functional architecture visually provides a logical decision process for the 
MADMAN that applies to the three alternatives. The method for determining the 
importance of each subsystem supports metric definition, which allows a direct 
comparison between alternatives. Following the basic determination of subsystem 
probabilities needed to provide a successful mission; a sensitivity analysis details the 
shortfalls. The sensitivity analysis provides insight into where probabilities could 
decrease to provide cost savings or increase when it would merit a significant 
improvement in mission success (more mines laid). Resulting new probabilities allow a 
cost savings while maintaining confidence in mission success. The modeling and 




Alternative selection can be critical to the development of a successful, efficient 
system. It may be the case that every alternative option is feasible and functional. The 
purpose for analyzing alternatives, especially when they are all similar or all attainable, is 
that it is in the best interest of the U.S. Navy to select the system that has the highest 
chance for success. Table 13 displays a summary of the requirements and objectives 
discussed in previous chapters with its corresponding value measure and category.  
Table 13. Requirements, Objectives, and Value Measures Linkage. 
MADMAN System 
Requirements 
Key Objectives Value Measures Category 
The system shall be capable 




Transport of Mine Technical 
The system shall avoid 
detection while in the active 
mission area 
Avoid detection Stealth and System Sensors Performance, 
Technical 
The system shall be 
deployable Deployable Operational Range Performance 
The system shall be able to 
accept engage and disengage 
commands 
Respond to 
mission start and 
abort 
Communications Performance 
The system shall 









The system shall use existing 
naval mine warhead and 
influence systems 
Sustainable Integration Technical 
The system shall reduce risk 








Technical measures explore the transport of the mine, autonomy, system 
integration, and mine sensors. Performance measures include operational range, 
communication capability, position accuracy, and stealth factor. Cost assesses 
development, acquisition, and sustainment efforts. Risk is the last of the four categories 
and includes technical, performance, cost, and personnel risk. Combining these 
discussions with the modeling serves to provide a complete picture of expected 
alternative behavior. For evaluating alternatives consistently, the following definitions 
explain the ratings in each of the categories.  
High  
• Technical characteristics significantly achieve mission requirements. 
• Performance characteristics significantly achieve mission requirements. 
• Cost is significant requiring extensive modifications. 
• Risk significantly impacts mission requirements. 
 
Medium 
• Technical characteristics moderately achieve mission requirements. 
• Performance characteristics moderately achieve mission requirements. 
• Cost is moderate requiring some modifications. 
• Risk moderately impacts mission requirements. 
 
Low 
• Technical characteristics partially achieve mission requirements. 
• Performance characteristics partially achieve mission requirements. 
• Cost is low requiring no or minimal modifications. 
• Risk partially impacts mission requirements. 
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A. ALTERNATIVE 1 – UUV DEPLOYMENT 
The unmanned underwater vehicle (UUV) deployment calls for either a ship or 
submarine to release a self-propelled device carrying a naval mine at a safe distance. The 
self-propelled device (MADMAN) autonomously navigates from the launch point until 
the entire device reaches the deployment location upon which it will sink to the bottom 
and activate the mine portion of the device.  
1. Technical
Utilizing a UUV for deployment provides inherited technical capabilities 
depending on the selected model. There is a broad spectrum of UUVs. Many of those 
UUV options natively provide features closely aligned with MADMAN objectives. 
UUVs used in mine countermeasure activities provide navigation, sensors, internal 
monitoring, and transiting systems. Additionally, they can carry many sizes of payloads 
internally or externally. The ability to carry different payloads translates to the ability to 
carry the MADMAN with minor modifications.  
Autonomous UUVs that deliver mines and perform offensive mining tasks do not 
exist. Lacking that delivery is a limitation of the transport ability exhibited by currently 
fielded systems. The reserved payload space also accounts for the ability to upgrade the 
sensor suite of the UUV, allowing for proprietary additions and upgrades. Current sensor 
systems include three dimensional, sonar, magnetic, and electronic detection capabilities 
with high definition cameras. Preprogrammed sensors provide data to existing 
programmable software. Currently operating mine countermeasure UUVs are already 
capable of performing many identification and avoidance tasks required by the 
MADMAN. The software allows MADMAN to engage in completely autonomous, pre-
programmed missions and includes internal system monitoring. The UUV provides 
nearly every system required to achieve the central goals of MADMAN. From this 
perspective, integration into an offensive mining capability requires low effort. An 
example system available for commercial use is the Remus 6000 with many available 
subsystems as shown in Figure 41. 
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Figure 41. Hydroid Remus 6000 Multiple Features. Source: Hydroid (2015). 
The Hydroid Remus 6000 operates at a relatively quick speed on average (about 
four knots, or two meters per second) and has no requirement to surface during mission 
operations. This alternative is very favorable from a technical perspective due to the 
availability of required capabilities and native functions in many UUVs. With an 
understanding of what the UUV is technically capable of, next is to examine how well 
those functions perform. 
2. Performance 
A UUV approach provides exceptional levels of demonstrated performance for 
many functions required of the MADMAN system. An exploration of the Autonomous 
Undersea Vehicle Applications Center (AUVAC), a publicly available database, revealed 
over one hundred applicable UUVs that contained many of the required capabilities. This 
availability results in a very high-performing alternative. Extensive research leads to the 
identification of a common configuration for matching speed and endurance requirements 
enabling the UUV to travel for about 24 hours at approximately four knots (Table 14). 
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Table 14. Selected UUV Operating Speed and Endurance Time Comparison. Adapted 
from: Autonomous Undersea Vehicle Applications Center (AUVEC) (2018). 
UUVs have a tradeoff between speed and endurance. The inverse relationship 
between speed and endurance means that final stakeholder opinion may consider this 
common configuration a performance hindrance depending upon on the timeframe 
required for minefield development. Communication elements installed on current UUV 
options are typically the most advanced forms of underwater communication available. 
From an underwater perspective, these devices communicate within their specified range 
very well. These are limiting factors, however, because the communication is within a 
certain range and only underwater. UUVs likely cannot communicate with satellites, 
preventing live updating accuracy.  
Potential options for communications include floating buoy communications to 
satellites, or underwater network. UUV options currently available do not include these 
features. Navigation systems have matured greatly over the last few decades, and 
sophisticated sea maps exist for upload to UUVs. UUVs can use these maps to identify 
their target area for creating a minefield. Similar to the communication limitation, 
navigation is reliant on the accuracy of their onboard sensors and pre-loaded maps to 
guide them to their deployment areas. This limitation is minor and modern mapping, and 
navigation systems keep this performance aspect considered high. Finally, from a stealth 
UUV Model Speed (Knots) Endurance (Hours) 
SeaWolf 8 3 
Bluefin-12 4 26 
Exoceterus 3 70 
Remus 6000 5 22 
Hugin 3000 3 60 
Alister REA 4 12 
SQX-500 4 8 
Seahorse 4 72 
Sparus II 11 8 
Comet 6 12 
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perspective, the UUV performs fairly well. While the device is not silent, due to the use 
of motors to propel it, there is no requirement to surface during mission activities, 
preventing the device from exposing itself visually on the water surface. From a 
performance perspective, the UUV option performs well with minor limitations. 
3. Cost 
The cost of all the alternatives will pertain to the procurement and alteration 
required to the mine. The cost breaks down into particular life cycles: development, 
procurement, and sustainment. Development focuses on the alterations required for 
mostly autonomous performance. In the performance and technical portion of the UUV 
alteration, communications are a major concern and require additional funding for 
incorporation of this capability. New modifications to add autonomous capability into the 
mine and programming of the system requires further evaluation. For sustainment, the 
fiberglass and non-ferrous case suggest the maintenance cost as more economical and 
easily accessible to other components in the mine for alteration or repair.  
Overall, the UUV alternative requires minimal change to carry the mine, has 
affordable pricing and its ability to be more readily available makes it a captivating low-
cost option. The use of a standard mine, like the Mark 60 Captor is a low-cost option 
based on its time in service and competitive pricing. The current cost of Mark 60 is 
$113,000 per mine (National Research Council 2000). MADMAN also requires software 
and hardware modifications to meet the required capabilities.   
4. Risk 
Risk analysis for the UUV deployment alternative presents a summary of the risks 
identified and maps each on a three by three risk matrix. Risk matrices identify and 
quantify risks associated with jeopardizing mission success. Using the same three areas 
of development risk, technical risk and personnel risk allows for a consistent evaluation 
of the three alternatives. Figure 42 illustrates a risk assessment for each technical, 
performance, cost and an additional category of personnel risk. The UUV option presents 
a low-risk option for the development of MADMAN.   
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Figure 42. UUV Alternative Risk Summary. 
a. Technical Risk
UUVs currently exist providing nearly every system required for achievement of 
MADMAN goals. Transitioning of current UUV systems to offensive mining requires 
minimal effort making the technical risk highly unlikely with partial mission impact.  
b. Performance Risk
While the UUV alternative has improved control at slower speeds, technically, the 
tradeoff between the distance traveled, and speed means that expeditious deployment of a 
minefield is at risk. Although the risk of detection decreases at slower speeds, the UUVs 
inability to communicate with satellites introduces risk for mission redirection or 
termination. These factors make this risk highly unlikely but with a partial mission 
impact.  
c. Cost Risk
Some minor modifications are required for this alternative but are not significant 
in the scheme of things. The low development, maintenance, and sustainment cost make 
the cost risk unlikely with no/minor mission impact.  
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d. Personnel Risk 
Once deployed and transits begin out of the explosive damage range, the risk to 
personnel dissolves with completely unmanned UUVs. The UUV option operates fully 
autonomously dissolving all risk to friendly forces. Due to the autonomous nature of this 
alternative, personnel risk is highly unlikely with no/minor mission impact.  
5. Alternative 1 Summary 
Use of a UUV device to move the mine from a launch ship presents many benefits 
over other possibilities. Historically, although not considered a UUV at the time, the 
SLMM operated with many similarities to a UUV. A UUV approach allows for 
accomplishing multiple mission areas encompassing multiple types of launch platforms 
facilitate using a UUV approach. If one were to consider the mine as simply a payload, 
the UUV quickly jumps to the forefront as the easiest, quickest, and least costly 
alternative to pursue when developing an autonomous underwater device.  
However, if we place more emphasis on minimizing the risk to human life, a 
UUV approach presents limitations for full consideration by stakeholders. The UUV 
approach has a limited standoff range. A launch vehicle must transport the UUV near the 
littoral areas. Depending on the timeline, this might become prohibitive to deployment 
based on combat operations. Stakeholders must understand this limitation should a UUV 
approach be selected.   





Cost (Min) Risk 
(Min) 
Alternative 1: UUV High Medium Low Low 
 
B. ALTERNATIVE 2 – WAVE GLIDER DEPLOYMENT 
In 2007, Liquid Robotics, an American marine robotics corporation now owned 
by Boeing, introduced the first Wave Glider. When assessing Wave Glider as an 
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alternative, it is clear that the system travels long distances and has little to no need for 
external sources once programmed for its mission. The wave glider approach calls for a 
ship or submarine to launch a Wave Glider that also carries a mine device. Sea currents 
propel the overall device into contested littoral waters. Wave Glider lacks conventional 
motorized propulsion, which quickly makes them the covert option between the 
alternatives from an acoustic signature perspective. Once the Wave Glider reaches a 
target location, it releases the mines for autonomous transit to reach its destination and set 
an active minefield. 
1. Technical
Using sea currents and tides, the Wave Glider travels underneath the water in a 
saw-tooth pattern to generate propulsion. The Wave Glider is a good candidate for mine 
transport because; it is equipped to tow payloads (Figure 43) using the force of the ocean. 
The saw-tooth travel pattern, however, causes the Wave Glider to travel around half a 
knot. Half a knot is eight times slower than the UUV option, which is a potential 
drawback depending on final stakeholder opinion. 
Figure 43. Wave Glider Towing Additional Payload with Sensor Release. Source: (A 
Boeing Company 2018) 
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The towing capability of the Wave Glider offers the possibility to carry additional 
sensors. Wave Glider could release sensors along the journey to increase the range of 
detection for deployed mines. In place of deploying multiple sensors in transit, deploying 
multiple Wave Glider allows for a wide range of detection of enemy vehicles and 
underwater obstacles (Figure 44). While these primary Wave Glider tasks meet some of 
the needs of MADMAN, their main functions align more closely with mine 
countermeasure devices and tend toward surveillance. System adjustments would be 
required to address an offensive purpose.  
 
Figure 44. Wave Glider Multiple Deployment Communications Grid. Source: A Boeing 
Company (2018). 
Similar to the UUV, the Wave Glider is an unmanned vehicle. There is no need 
for human involvement once the Wave Glider deploys and it can carry out autonomous 
missions. The system as it stands however is not as MADMAN-ready as the UUV and 
integration into an offensive mining device requires a reasonable amount of effort. 
2. Performance 
Without the need for a thrust-based propulsion design, there is lower system 
power consumption. This translates to extended travel range for the Wave Glider and 
ultimately the MADMAN. Using sea power instead of engine thrust means that the 
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device is low power. This could provide power to different systems, allowing for 
capabilities that are more robust. Natively, the Wave Glider system has a permanently 
surfaced element that communication with satellites and remote command systems. This 
allows live location and mission updating. This feature means that the Wave Glider’s 
exceptional potential to meet communication requirements makes it a viable alternative. 
The Wave Glider also surpasses the UUV in navigational performance. While it uses the 
same navigational tools, the Wave Glider can regularly update location information, 
allowing redirection or affirmation of staying on target. While performing silently in the 
water, the tradeoff exists due to the communications system. The surface portion of the 
Wave Glider is visible and detectable to a degree. While long-range sensors may not pick 
up the device, they may be visible to aircraft or enemy vessels on approach to their target 
location. Ultimately, the Wave Glider performs very well, has most systems required for 
a successful mission, but is slow and visible from the surface. 
3. Cost
The Wave Glider has gone through several iterations since 2007, and Wave 
Glider SV3 is currently in development with an expected cost $300,000 a unit (Takahashi 
2013). In the development of this alternative, the need to modify the system is vastly 
more extensive. Development requires external programs’ involvement while the UUV 
and aircraft alternatives offer the capability for in-house enhancement. Also, tethering 
mines or sensors to a float requires additional propulsion, power capabilities, an anchor   
mechanism, and hardware and software modifications to the float and submerged 
carriage. The time required to develop these features are very extensive and can promote 
many hours of testing. 
Considering sustainment, the Wave Glider has simple components and a very 
high MTBF that give it lesser chance of failure and less spare parts needed during 
sustainment. The procurement cost for the Wave Glider costs more for each unit 
compared to the other alternatives, and that is not including labor-hours to test and field. 
In addition, once the Wave Glider is ready to submerge, the additional equipment 
required releasing it from its float and anchoring to the seabed would require additional 
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design efforts to complete the mission. If failures do occur, the time needed to report 
repairs is significant. Wave Glider offers system independence and does not require 
assistance from external entities to perform its mission. While Wave Glider offers the 
ability to deploy without an external vehicle, its development and procurement costs are 
higher than the UUV and aircraft alternatives.   
4. Risk 
While Wave Glider offers many benefits with built-in fleet connectivity 
producing a large communications grid and a greater MTBF, risk is inherent for newly 
developed/modified systems as seen in Figure 45. 
 
Figure 45. Wave Glider Alternative Summary. 
a. Technical Risk 
The Wave Glider alternative requires significant changes to release itself from its 
float and requires additional development for anchoring to the seabed increasing the 
development risk. Development risk becomes likely with partial mission impact.  
b. Performance Risk 
Wave Glider’s visibility from the surface and slow speed increase the possibility 
for detection by enemy forces. Once detected, chances increase for enemy forces to 
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prevent the MADMAN from accomplishing its mission. Technical risk becomes unlikely 
and partially influences the mission.  
c. Cost Risk
Cost risk increases for the Wave Glider alternative due to the requirement and 
development of additional propulsion, power, anchoring, hardware, and software 
modifications. However, additional development cost assesses cost risk as highly unlikely 
with partial mission impact.  
d. Personnel Risk
Similar to the UUV alternative, the Wave Glider provides safety to personnel 
after its deployed. The removal of risk to personnel makes this highly unlikely with 
no/minor mission impact.  
5. Alternative 2 Summary
Use of a Wave Glider presents new opportunities to the warfighter. Wave Glider 
has a potentially unlimited range that allows mines to penetrate into the deepest areas of 
enemy controlled territories. Wave Glider presents other technological opportunities to 
increase the effectiveness of a mine device. Wave Glider as it transits into the desired 
area could lay a sensor system capable of communicating with the mine a variety of data 
to include target location from further standoff ranges.  
For all of the standout areas that Wave Glider could further develop, active 
mining capabilities lack reliably proven methods by existing systems. The potential to 
realize all of the potential areas for development exposes stakeholders to not only 
increased costs but also increased risk summarized in Table 16. 









Medium High Medium-High Medium 
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C. ALTERNATIVE 3 – AIRCRAFT DEPLOYMENT 
Although current mining technologies involve the use of air-dropped naval mines, 
development of an air-dropped version of MADMAN requires exploration. Current naval 
mines free fall from the delivery vehicle to the seabed, adding an autonomous navigation 
capability to these device aids in preventing MCM efforts by enemy forces. An air 
dropped version of MADMAN would closely resemble the UUV-based alternative but 
would likely result in a shorter underwater deployment range based on weight 
requirements. The airdropped variant would also require hardening of technologies used 
in development due to impact with the water following launch from the aircraft. This 
option is the fastest to deploy and most familiar to current operations between the 
alternatives. However, this is the most dangerous to the mine structure and the personnel 
delivering the MADMAN. 
1. Technical 
This proven method is today’s method used for building minefields. Flying mines 
into the littoral region is the fastest delivery method. One main performance area that 
aircraft option exceeds at is speed for deployment of a minefield. Using a P-3 Orion as an 
example aircraft, it has a cruising speed of 328 knots, meaning that it would only take one 
hour to travel 610 kilometers. Additionally, the airdrop method is not limited to oversea 
delivery. An aircraft can fly over landmass to shortcut travel time to littoral waters. Using 
an aircraft supports desires for a quick development of a minefield. Sensor suites on 
aircraft are typically the latest available and are likely beyond the classification of this 
project. With that in mind, it is safe to assume that the sensor systems would perform 
exceptionally well. The aircraft that drop mines are currently manned aircraft, so there is 
not a high degree of autonomy when using this method. Integration of the MADMAN 
would be relatively easy provided the system could fit into a standard mine enclosure as 
seen in Figure 46 of a MK 62 Quick Strike mine is being released. 
Aircraft deploy multiple types of weapons in a naval battle. Multiple types of 
torpedoes, CAPTOR or Quick Strike mines and missiles all deploy from aircraft currently 
used by U.S. naval forces. Availability of launching platforms is not a limiting factor. 
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Torpedoes present many similarities to a UUV system. The most restrictive areas 
regarding integration are likely the systems required for long-term autonomous 
navigation and weight of fuel required allowing for longer transits.  
Figure 46. MK 62 Quick Strike Mine Deploying from Aircraft. Source: Pietrucha 
(2016). 
2. Performance
An aircraft is fast, allowing the mine to get to a target location quickly. The 
operational range is far greater than the other two alternatives. Human alertness and fuel 
restrictions limit an aircraft’s flight time. From a purely operational range perspective, an 
aircraft performs better with the target drop site identified. The communications system 
performs exceptionally well because an aircraft utilizes the same instruments as the other 
alternatives and adds the human element. The command center receives a visual 
identification of obstacles and mission situations reports quickly. Computers built into the 
aircraft allow relatively precise location determination, but the ultimate accuracy would 
depend on the airdrop itself.  
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Aircraft have fine-tuned instruments detailing a precise target location and 
dropping mines at high speed only lowers that precision to a negligible degree. From a 
stealth perspective, the aircraft alternative does not perform well. This large aircraft will 
immediately appear on radar and be visible to enemy forces. Adversary detection of the 
aircraft does not guarantee mine detection. However, it places a large beacon on where 
minefield deployment may occur. Overall, the aircraft is a familiar system that performs 
relatively well with minimal automation and stealth.  
3. Cost 
The aircraft alternative cost is similar to the UUV with a procurement cost of 
$113,000 for each unit and similar spare parts requirements. The difference between 
UUV and aircraft alternatives is the weight constraints, equipment hardening, battery life, 
and more software modifications. Although the mark 60 Captor supports air and sea 
deployment, releasing multiple units from the air has limitations in item weight. 
Removing weight results in removal of items like batteries that adds substantial weight to 
the mine. Removal of batteries means reduction to speed of MADMAN is required to 
transit to the deployment point with enough remaining power after anchoring. These 
factors create an increase in cost in development to modify the mine with smaller parts to 
address weight and additional time to develop software to assure the mine still meets the 
previous requirements as well as the autonomous aspect of the mission. 
The sustainment of the system as mentioned should be the same as the UUV 
based on accessibility to parts within the mine that require repair. Overall, the aircraft 
alternative has historical data giving it confidence for success. Requiring modifications 
based on weight restrictions will reduce some performance parameters like propulsion 
and introduces additional cost to the development and procuring of this alternative. The 
procurement of the items also increases based on altering the standard mine due to 
weight. 
4. Risk 
Aircraft is the current delivery method making this a proven method but with 
some risks as seen in Figure 47. 
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Figure 47. Aircraft Alternative Risk Summary. 
a. Technical Risk
Development risk is highly unlikely with no/minor mission impact since this is 
the current method of delivery and development is minimal. Technically, the aircraft 
transports the mine with available system sensors, and system integration is easily 
accomplished. The technical risk increased in the autonomous aspect making technical 
risk unlikely and an inability to complete the mission.  
b. Performance Risk
The aircraft deployment alternative increases accuracy issues. Even with fine-
tuned instruments detailing a precise target location, deploying mines at high speed 
lowers precision jeopardizing successful completion of the mission. The stealth aspects of 
this deployment method are also low making the performance risk unlikely with the 
inability to complete the mission.  
c. Cost Risk
The aircraft alternative requires some minor modifications to support 
MADMAN’s mission. While some modifications are required to increase performance, 
cost assessment becomes highly unlikely and minor mission impact.  
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d. Personnel Risk 
Large piloted aircraft immediately appear on radar making it detectable by enemy 
forces. This alternative limits the ability for a covert delivery placing human pilots at risk 
of counter air strikes. There is an increased risk to personnel during operations because 
enemy forces can counter-attack preventing mission completion. Personnel risk becomes 
likely and cannot complete the mission. 
5. Alternative 3 Summary 
While deployment of the system from an aircraft significantly lowers the time to 
establish a minefield, the main risk that MADMAN is attempting to remove the risk to 
human life, remains. Aircraft delivery requires a pilot flying into the littoral areas to place 
MADMAN close to its desired location. The range that MADMAN can travel following 
drop into the area is likely to be less than other deployed options based on weight. The 
reduction in range that MADMAN can traverse following launch only serves to increase 
the risk to human life when establishing a minefield.  
Familiarity of using the airdrop method and knowledge of the associated timeline 
provide known benefits. Cost for an airdropped version of MADMAN is similar to those 
of a UUV and in actuality could be higher for the airdropped version to allow for the 
shocks experienced with an aircraft deployment. Table 17 summarizes the results of the 
aircraft deployment alternative against technical, performance, cost, and risk categories.  





Cost (Min) Risk 
(Min) 
Alternative 3: 
Aircraft High Medium Medium High 
 
D. SUMMARY OF ALTERNATIVES 
After the value measures map against requirements, the importance of each value 
measure receives a weight in numerical form. The four value weight categories: 
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technical, performance, cost, and risk helps to distinguish the importance of each value 
measure (Table 18). 
Table 18. Value Measures Weights. 

























Each value measure aligns with a measure of importance used for comparing 
alternatives. The value measures sum, individually divide, then provide a percentage of 
importance to the overall system. Those value measures decompose into subcategories, 
which calculate in the same way, and then provide their percentage importance within 
their value measure. These final decimal numbers are the swing weights that highlight 
importance to the system. The resulting numbers appear in Figure 48. 
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Figure 48. Value Measure, Value, and Swing Weights. 
The swing weights provide a comparable metric for importance of individual 
elements to the overall system. The next step is detailing raw scores of each analysis 
section to demonstrate preference between alternatives. These raw scores map to the 
previous detailed analysis of each alternative. A score of 5 results for an assessment of 
“High” in the technical and performance categories as well as a score of “Low” in the 
cost and risk categories, which means:   
• Technical characteristics significantly achieve mission requirements. 
• Performance characteristics significantly achieve mission requirements. 
• Cost is low requiring no or minimal modifications. 




A score of 3 results for an assessment of “Med”, which means: 
• Technical characteristics moderately achieve mission requirements.
• Performance characteristics moderately achieve mission requirements.
• Cost is moderate requiring some modifications.
• Risk moderately affects mission requirements.
A score of 1 results for an assessment of “Low” in technical and performance and 
a score of “High” in cost and risk categories, which means:  
• Technical characteristics partially achieve mission requirements.
• Performance characteristics partially achieve mission requirements.
• Cost is significant requiring extensive modifications.
• Risk significantly affects mission requirements.
Raw scores used in conjunction with the swing weights produces weighted scores. 
Table 19 captures the summary of scores for each of the alternatives. 
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Table 19. Alternatives Summary of Scores. 













TECHNICAL SCORE High 18 Med 10 High 16 
Transport of Mine Med 3 Low 1 High 5 
System Sensors High 5 Med 3 Low 1 
Autonomy High 5 Med 3 High 5 
System Integration High 5 Med 3 High 5 
PERFORMANCE 
SCORE Med 14 High 16 Med 14 
Operational Range Med 3 High 5 High 5 
Communication Med 3 High 5 High 5 
Position Accuracy High 5 High 5 Med 3 
Stealth Med 3 Low 1 Low 1 
COST SCORE Low 15 Med-High 7 Med 9 
Development Low 5 High 1 High 1 
Procurement Low 5 High 1 Med 3 
Sustainment Low 5 Low 5 Low 5 
RISK SCORE Low 20 Low-Med 14 Med-High 8 
Technical Risk Low 5 High 1 High 1 
Performance Risk Low 5 Med 3 High 1 
Cost Risk Low 5 Low 5 Low 5 
Personnel Risk Low 5 Low 5 High 1 
 
Table 20 summarizes the swing weights for each alternative providing easily 
comparable scores in each category. Values for technical, performance, cost, and risk 
measures provide a baseline for comparison. This baseline is a combination of 
normalized swing weights that provide a value to system effectiveness and the raw scores 
that indicate alternative proficiency in each category. The product of swing weights and 
raw scores result in a final value measure for the alternatives. 
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Table 20. Alternatives Scoring. 










Technical 85 .29 4.41 2.41 3.59 
Transport of Mine 25 0.29 0.88 0.29 1.47 
System Sensors 15 0.18 0.88 0.53 0.88 
Autonomy 30 0.35 1.76 1.06 0.35 
Integration 15 0.18 0.88 0.53 0.88 
Performance 75 .25 3.53 3.67 3.13 
Operational 
Range 20 0.27 0.80 1.33 1.33 
Communications 10 0.13 0.40 0.67 0.67 
Position Accuracy 20 0.27 1.33 1.33 0.80 
Stealth 25 0.33 1.00 0.33 0.33 
Cost 65 .22 5.00 1.92 2.69 
Development 25 0.38 1.92 0.38 0.38 
Procurement 25 0.38 1.92 0.38 1.15 
Sustainment 15 0.23 1.15 1.15 1.15 
Risk 70 .24 5.00 3.71 1.57 
Technical Risk 15 0.21 1.07 0.21 0.21 
Performance Risk 15 0.21 1.07 0.64 0.21 
Cost Risk 10 0.14 0.71 0.71 0.71 
Personnel Risk 30 0.43 2.14 2.14 0.43 
TOTAL SCORE 295 1.00 17.95 11.72 10.99 
Green shaded boxes denote the best score in each overall value measure 
The UUV alternative receives the highest score in technical, cost, and risk while 
the Wave Glider alternative receives the highest score in performance. The UUV 
alternative is most likely to address all of MADMAN’s key objectives with the lowest 
cost and lowest risk. 
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VI. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The MADMAN study offers a path forward in future offensive mining endeavors. 
While there is no single answer, the research provided in this paper designates what 
improvements would be required to meet mission needs and satisfy stakeholder 
requirements. At the close of this project, there is no result because the intention was not 
to design a solution; rather, the purpose was to collect all of the elements necessary to 
develop the plan for creating a successful system. This final section highlights the lessons 
learned, future recommendations, and conclusions for the MADMAN. 
A. RECOMMENDATIONS 
Current industry trends point toward efficiency and rapid turnaround of system 
development. In some instances, this is not possible and time is an unfortunate side effect 
of taking new technology into an operational state. The MADMAN project thrives on the 
concept of reuse. Weapons, navigational, monitoring, propulsion, anchoring, 
communication, and autonomous systems all currently exist. Incorporating all of these 
systems provides the potential for more sophisticated mission operations. The key 
concept of the MADMAN project is this integration of already existing systems into a 
functional system of systems. 
Development of this project led to the realization that while many alternatives 
performed well in some areas, they lacked in others. Examining technical capability, 
performance, cost, and risk provided clarity on each alternative. Running simulations 
over multiple iterations provided success metrics for each portion of the deployment 
chain for each alternative, resulting in a final success likelihood of mine deployment. The 
initial results of simulation demonstrated that the UUV outperformed the Wave Glider 
and aircraft options. From a basic modeling perspective, this means that the UUV 
successfully placed more mines, more frequently, with fewer failures than that of other 
options.  
Once identified as the better option, sensitivity analysis revealed potential 
probability leniency for the individual systems in the deployment chain. This leniency 
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translates to cost savings, allowing for less restrictive system requirements on certain 
systems. With lowered stringent probability requirements, systems do not need to attain 
unreasonable probabilities to reach a final goal. Without the sensitivity analysis, this 
would not be easy to identify because the degree to which probabilities affect the system 
success is not clear from a cursory glance at simulation results. The redesign of the 
probability needs additionally resulted in the UUV performing better in simulations when 
faced with high-density obstacle environments.  
From the resulting research performed and simulation results, the team 
recommends developing the MADMAN using the UUV deployment option. The updated 
probabilities provide easier development and better performance. There will be effort 
involved in the integration of existing systems with the offensive mining aspect. The 
team additionally recommends enlisting support from the designers or engineers from the 
company of the selected UUV model. Additional involvement of designers and engineers 
ensures first-hand support and experience with any integration issues encountered 
throughout the lifecycle of the system. 
B. CONCLUSIONS 
Naval mining as a system exists in maritime warfare and is a powerful tool for 
offense and even results in psychological defense against adversaries. Aircraft drop mines 
that lie in wait for their targets, but the system has room for improvement. Stakeholder 
analysis placed the two central goals of autonomy and safety at the top of the needs list. 
Current mining is minimal at best in both of these categories. This antiquated system 
requires intelligence and redesign in the fight for naval mining superiority. The most 
alluring aspect of this project is the ability to use existing autonomous systems. Where 
possible, improvements in launch success probability and automated obstacle avoidance 
capabilities can yield greater MADMAN mission success. Once integrated, this provides 
autonomy for the overall system and in turn creates a safer system by removing the 
human element in the deployment, delivery, and placement of the mine.  
In the modern world, funding is a constant concern. Projects greatly exceeding 
their budgets are creating vacuums for funds that would otherwise be available in other 
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areas. With the growing need for frugality, the MADMAN is an ideal candidate to 
minimize funding while maximizing operational effectiveness. Reuse affords minimal 
need for new design or system development. Many systems available are plug and play 
especially when it comes to UUV technology and capabilities. There are many in 
existence performing mine countermeasure activities, and it would require low effort to 
repurpose them into mining devices. They currently have obstacle detection, navigation, 
propulsion, payload transiting, and communication functions, which accounts for nearly 
all of the MADMAN requirements.  
Through a collaborative effort between government off-the-shelf or commercial 
off the shelf provided UUV prototypes, a fully integrated product is feasible. The UUV 
demonstrated a high rate of mission success when deploying mines and from a purely 
simulation perspective, was the clear leader. From a technical perspective, the UUV 
contains the necessary systems for mission success and requires minimal effort to rework 
into an offensive capability. The performance of the UUV from a transit and mission 
perspective requires minimal testing because the systems operate successfully in mission 
scenarios that are similar to the needs of MADMAN. Additionally, this known 
functionality, minimal need for testing, evaluation, and integration lowers the cost 
significantly. With the main effort as integration and adding features, there is no need for 
ground-up development. Finally, from a risk perspective, these mines can perform for 
long periods allowing them to travel far beyond dangerous proximity to personnel. 
Keeping our personnel free from harm is paramount in warfare, and this alternative 
ensures that safety.  
Dependence on the novel integration of these technologies presents a risk. 
Unfortunately, throughout all military history, project development does not have a 
perfect success rate. This risk forces leadership and stakeholders to be more discerning in 
their procurement and project decisions. However, other than integration of systems, 
relief appears in the form of low development and cost risk. The MADMAN pieces all 
exist and the completion of this puzzle will ensure that the Navy leads the way into the 
future of maritime warfare.   
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C. RECOMMENDED TECHNOLOGY INVESTMENT AREAS 
The recommended configuration of MADMAN expands the integration of 
existing technologies ultimately yielding a material solution that minimizes risk to human 
life while actively placing mines covertly in littoral areas. Future efforts should continue 
this effort, incorporating existing technologies to further not only the abilities of 
MADMAN but other warfare areas as well.  
Wave Glider is an area where future expansions of effort should yield viable 
solutions to existing problems. The Navy uses Wave Glider for surveillance of assets, 
search of areas, and scientific experiments. Wave Glider shows promise due to not only 
their autonomous nature of operations but also their low energy requirements. Further 




LIST OF REFERENCES 
Altget, Carlos A. “The Jurassic Radio Section.” Old Radio. 
https://www.oldradio.com/archives/jurassic/ (accessed 17 December 2017). 
Antanitus, David. 2016. “Maritime Autonomy: Reducing the Risk in a High Risk 
Program.” Defense Acquisition University, January-February: 24–28. 
Autonomous Undersea Vehicle Applications Center (AUVEC). 2018. Explore Database. 
http://auvac.org/explore-database/advanced-search/results_purpose (accessed 14 
March 2018). 
Barlow, Gavin, and Tim Hardy. 2008. “Unmanned Underwater Vehicle (UUV) 
Deployment and Retrieval Considerations for Submarines.” INEC 2008. 
Hamburg, Germany: BMT Defence Services, 15. 
Blanchard, Benjamin S., and Wolter J. Fabrycky. 2011. Systems Engineering and 
Analysis. 5th ed. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice-Hall. 
Bradley, Edgar. 2016. Reliability Engineering A Life cycle Approach. Boca Raton: CRC 
Press. 
Brito, Mario P., Carolina Dopico-Gonzalez, Catherine A. Harris, and Alexander B. 
Phillips. 2016. “Risk and Reliability Modelling for Multi-Vehicle Marine 
Domains.” IEEE/OES Autonomous Underwater Vehicles (AUV). Tokyo, Japan: 
IEEE. 
A Boeing Company. 2018. News & Resources.  https://www.liquid-robotics.com/about-
us/news/ (accessed 15 November 2017). 
Buede, Dennis M. 2009. The Engineering Design of Systems. 2nd ed. Hoboken, NJ: John 
Wiley & Sons. 
Deputy Chief Information Officer. 2010. “DoDAF – DoD Architecture Framework 
Version 2.02.” Chief Information Officer. U.S. Department of Defense. 
http://dodcio.defense.gov/Library/DoD-Architecture-Framework/ (accessed 18 
December 2017). 
Dahlgren Team, Cohort 311-1110. 2012. Ship Underwater Threat Reponses System 
(SUTRS): A feasibility study of organic mine point defense. Capstone Project 
Report, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey: Naval Postgraduate School. 
Draper Labs. 2016. Improving Stealth Capabilities for Undersea Vehicles. 10 May. 
http://www.draper.com/news/improving-stealth-capabilities-undersea-vehicles 
(accessed 8 January 2018). 
 116 
Electronica Submarina SAES. 2011. “Electronica Submarina SAES.” Exercise MINEA 
Multi-Influence Naval Mines. http://www.spainproductsfrommurcia.com/home/-
/detail/download/10941/naval-mines-multi-influence-
devices;jsessionid=6AF87DE546A8D76976758D6971BFE5A9 (accessed 20 
December 2017). 
Farrington, Clayton M. 2017. One Century Ago: Breaking Ground for an Assembly Plant 
of Doom. 20 October. http://hamptonroadsnavalmuseum.blogspot.com 
/2017/10/one-century-ago-breaking-ground-for.html (accessed 26 November 
2017). 
Friedman, Norman. T. 2006. The Naval Institute Guide to World Naval Weapons 
Systems. 5th ed. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press. 
Gady, Franz-Stefan. 2015. Confirmed: U.S. Navy Launches Underwater Drone From 
Sub. 24 July. https://thediplomat.com/2015/07/confirmed-us-navy-launches-
underwater-drone-from-sub/ (accessed 12 November 2017). 
Green, John. “The Kill Chain and Lusser’s Product Law.” Naval Postgraduate School. 
https://cle.nps.edu/portal/site (accessed 01 January 2018). 
Griffiths, Gwyn, Mario Brito, Ian Robbins, and Mark. Moline. 2009. “Reliability of two 
REMUS-100 AUVs Based on Fault Log Analysis and Elicited Expert Judgment.”  
Hanrahan, Cindy, and Teresa Cardoza. 2017. “Wave Glider Hot Spot: Enabling 
Autonomous Devices to Talk Back.”  October 30. https://www.mbari.org 
/technology/emerging-current-tools/communications/wave-glider-based-
communications-hotspot/ (accessed December 2017, 19). 
Hartshorn, Derick S. 2011. Naval Mines. 24 June. http://www.hartshorn.us/Navy/navy-
mines.htm (accessed 14 February 2018). 
Hydroid. 2015. REMUS 6000 for Defense Applications.  
https://www.hydroid.com/remus-6000-defense-applications (accessed 12 
December 2017). 
Karras, G and Kyriakopoulos, K. 2007. “Localization of an Underwater Vehicle Using an 
IMU and a Laser-Based Vision System.” Mediterranean Conference on Control 
& Automation. Control & Automation. 1–6. 
King, A.D. 2017. “Inertial Navigation – Forty Years of Evolution.” GEC REVIEW (31 
December. General Electric Company PLC) 13, no. 3. 
Kossiakoff, Alexander, William N. Sweet, Samuel J. Seymour, and M. Steven Biemer. 
2011. Systems Engineering Principles and Practice. 2nd ed. Hoboken: John 
Wiley & Sons. 
117 
Learning Lincoln Online. 2017. “USS Cairo.” http://www.learningabe.info 
/Uss_Cairo_Gunboat_info.htm (accessed 26 November 2017). 
Manley, Justin, and Scott Wilcox. 2010. The Wave Glider: A Persistent Platform for 
Ocean Science. Sunnyvale, CA. 
Milford, Frederick J. 1997. “Webcite.” U.S. Navy Torpedoes. October. 
https://www.webcitation.org/query?url=http://www.geocities.com/Pentagon/1592
/ustorp5.htm&date=2009-10-25+09:26:07 (accessed 18 December 2017). 
National Academy of Engineering. 2003. Environmental Information for Naval Warfare. 
Washington: National Academies Press. 
National Research Council. 2001. Naval Mine Warfare: Oprational and Technical 
Challenges for Naval Forces. doi:10.17226/10176. Washington, D.C.: Naval 
Mine Warfare. 
———. 2000. Oceanography and Mine Warfare. doi.org/10.17226/9773. Washington, 
D.C.: National Academy Press. 
Naval Drones. 2017. Universal Launch and Recovery Module (ULRM). 
http://www.navaldrones.com/ULRM.html (accessed 11 January 2018). 
Naval Mine Warfare Engineering Activity. 1985. NAVSEA Familiarizer. Yorktown. VA. 
Naval Research Advisory Committee. 2012. “How Autonomy Can Transform Naval 
Operations.” Naval Research Advisory Committee, Arlington, VA. 
Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics. 
2016. “DSB Task Force Report on Next-Generation Unmanned Undersea 
Systems.” Study on Next-Generation Unmanned Undersea Systems. Prod. 
Defense Science Board, Washington, D.C. 
Partana, Jim, Jim Kurosea, and Brian Neil Levine. 2016.  “A Survey of Practical Issues in 
Underwater Networks.” Mobile Computing and Communications Review 11, (4): 
23–33. doi:10.1145/1234822. 
Picard. 2016. “Naval Mines.” Defense Issues. November 9. 
https://defenseissues.net/2017/05/01/naval-mines/ (accessed 26 November 2017). 
Pietrucha, Michael W. 2016. “Essay: Navy, Air Force Reviving Offensive Mining with 
New Quickstrikes.” April 26. https://news.usni.org/2016/04/26/essay-navy-air-
force-reviving-offensive-mining-with-new-quickstrikes (accessed 15 January 
2018). 
 118 
Pike, John. 1998. “MK-50 Advanced Lightweight Torpedo [ALWT].” Washington, D.C.: 
Federation of American Scientists. 
“FAS Military Analysis Network.” 12 December. https://fas.org/man/dod-
101/sys/ship/weaps/mk-50.htm (accessed 28 December 2017). 
———. 2011. “Submarine Communications.” FAS Military Analysis Network. 7 July. 
https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/ship/sub-comm.htm (accessed 20 
December 2017). 
Proshkin, Stanislav. 1999. “Russian Sea Mines.” http://milit.ru/mines.htm (accessed 26 
November 2017). 
Renilson, Martin. 2014. “A Simplified Concept for Recovering a UUV to a Submarine.” 
Underwater Technology: International Journal of the Society for Underwater 
(Society for Underwater Technology) 32, (3): 193–197. doi: 10.3723/ut.32.193. 
RWM S.p.A. 2013. MURENA – Multi Influence Sea Mine. 
http://www.aiad.it/aiad_res/cms/documents/Murena.pdf (accessed 20 December 
2017). 
Schmickl, Thomas. 2011. “CoCoRo – The Self-aware Underwater Swarm.” Fifth IEEE 
Conference on Self-Adaptive and Self-Organizing Systems Workshops. Ann 
Arbor, Michigan: IEEE. 
Shinego, Michael, Geoff Edelson, Francine Menas, Michael Richman, and Robert 
Nation. 2001. “Underwater Acoustic Data Communications for Autonomous 
Platform Command, Control and Communications.” Advanced Systems and 
Technology. December. 1–140. doi:10.21236/ada389546. 
Takahashi, Dean. Venturebeat. 2013.  ”Liquid Robotics Launches New Generation of 
Wave Glider Ocean Robots.” VentureBeat. VentureBeat. April 8. 
https://venturebeat.com/2013/04/08/liquid-robotics-launches-new-generation-of-
wave-glider-ocean-robots/ (accessed 5 May 2018). 
Tang, Kanghua, Jinling Wang, Wanli Li, and Wenqi Wu. 2013. “A Novel INS and 
Doppler Sensors Calibration Method for Long Range Underwater Vehicle 
Navigation.” Sensors 13 (11): 14583–600. doi:10.3390/s131114583. 
Truver, Scott C. 2015. “Second Line of Defense – Delivering Capabilities to the 
Warfighter.” Closing the U.S. Navy’s Mine Warfare Gap. June 20. 
http://www.sldinfo.com/closing-the-us-navys-mine-warfare-gap/ (accessed 3 
January 2018). 
U.S. Department of Commerce, and National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration. 
2013. “What Is Sonar?” NOAA’s National Ocean Service. June 1. 
https://oceanservice.noaa.gov/facts (accessed 16 April 2018). 
119 
United States Air Force Office of Aerospace Studies. 2014. Capabilities-Based 
Assessment (CBA) Handbook. Kirtland AFB, NM: Air Force Materiel Command. 
Van Walree, Paul., et al. 2018. “UUV Covert Acoustic Communications.” Underwater 
Technology Group, Oude Waalsdorperweg. 
Vandenberg, Tryo. 2010. Manning and Maintainability of a Submarine Unmanned 
Undersea Vehicle (UUV) Program a Systems Engineering Case Study. Thesis, 
Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School. 
Warfaresims.com. 2016. Naval Mines in Command. 16 December. 
http://www.warfaresims.com/?p=4408 (accessed 17 November 2017). 
WeaponSystems.net. 2002.WeaponSystems.net.  
http://weaponsystems.net/weaponsystem/HH14%20-%20Mk%2046.html 
(accessed 13 December 2017). 
 120 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK   
121 
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 
1. Defense Technical Information Center
Ft. Belvoir, Virginia
2. Dudley Knox Library
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California
